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Some of the most important work in the development of economic theory is associated with
the study of market structure. In essence, most markets are two-sided. For example, product
markets connect tens of thousands of product brands to tens of millions of consumers; marriage
markets couple the single men and women who would otherwise suffer from a lonely heart;
and labour markets link the job candidates to their preferred employers and positions. Apart
from the two-sidedness, we have explored another important common aspect of these market
structures, i.e. interconnection/competition of the segments within one side of the market.
Under this common thread, the three essays in this thesis are freshly formulated in a loosely
related manner, covering topics in three different areas.
Chapter 2 is motivated by strategic transitions of many marketplaces (e.g. Amazon.com).
From the perspective of a platform owner, when it owns part of the business on one side of the
market, there is no straightforward answer as to whether having the rest of business owned by
others is advantageous or not. The argument is that, on the one hand, the platform welcomes
more third-party business as it boosts revenue in terms of membership fees; on the other hand
the business owned by the platform dislikes the incoming competitors whose participation drives
down profit margins. We propose a novel framework in this chapter to explore the trade-off
between the two. Here, the intermediary can decide to be either a "merchant" or a "two-sided
platform", or a hybrid one in between. Our analysis shows that in hybrid mode the platform
extracts all the surplus from the producers of the merchandised brands, and the merchandised
brands always charge a price premium compared to the directly retailed ones. We also show
that as the platform absorbs an existing directly retailed brand into the self-brand portfolio,
the equilibrium prices of both brand types are increased. We find that only the directly retailed
brands dominate the market when the platform’s capacity is relatively small; and both brand
types coexist in the marketplace when the capacity is relatively large. Furthermore, we find a
backward bending proportion plus a vertical proportion of the "contract curve" in comparative
statics. That is, the self-brand portfolio always expands while the third-party-brand portfolio
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shrinks until it reaches a certain level, when the platform increases its capacity. It helps us to
gain some ideas on the dynamics of brand portfolio management for the platform. Lastly, taking
into account of indirect network effect which is the common feature in the two-sided market, it
is shown that the platform is better off when consumers have positive expected surplus.
Chapter 3 is much motivated by the Chinese experience. China has witnessed the largest
rural to urban labour flow (among which the majority are male) in the world’s history over the
last three decades. We propose an idea that the grand migration can also be attributed to the
unbalanced sex ratio between rural and urban areas. This chapter develops a two-sided matching
model of two linked marriage markets with homogeneous agents, non-transferable utility and
search friction. We extend the one-market model of the previous literature into a two-market
one, allowing the agents to migrate between the markets at a fixed cost. The analysis focuses on
the unmatched as well as the migrating population, which is induced by the different sex ratios
in the two geographically isolated marriage markets. We find that imperfections in the matching
technology leads to the enlarged gap of sex ratio of the unmatched population compared to that
of the unbalanced inflows. We are interested in the question of how the migrating costs affect
the migration between rural and urban areas, and under what conditions a subsidy covering
migrating costs might benefit a party in the marriage markets. We characterise the equilibrium
set in the parameter space of migrating costs, and find that a full subsidy of migrating costs
does not necessarily benefit those who receive it but always benefits the opposite sex, if they
are the short sides of both markets.
Chapter 4 explains the migration of labour force from a different angle. Here, the migration
is of workers to jobs. Motivated by the distinction of public and private sector, we consider a
spatial oligopsony model in which firms (two co-locating small firms with recruiting capacity
constraints and a large firm without such limit) are competing for workers along a "strip"
market. The capacity issue that is extensively discussed in the Chapter 2 again plays an
important role in this model, though in a very different context. It is shown that the recruiting
capacity affects the intra-group competition and hence the inter-group competition in wage-
posting strategies. Additionally, we show that, as recruiting limits expand, the expected wages
offered by the small firms increase while the wage offered by the big firm decreases, which helps
to explain the recent trend of the wage disparity between public and private jobs. We also
characterise the equilibrium wages and the size (direction) of the migration in the three-stage
game (i.e. the workers decide whether to relocate in the first stage, then the big firm decides
its wage offer, and lastly, the two co-locating firms simultaneous set wages), which helps us to
understand better the inter-sector mobility in a changing environment of economy.
We investigate the issues of interconnection and competition in three different markets. It
is always of interest for a researcher of economics to have some ideas on the same issue from
different perspectives. Remember that whilst this is a collection of essays on economic theory,
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it is nonetheless compared to empirical observation. And it will surely serve as a starting point
for the author to further the research on market structure.
3
Chapter 2
Brand Portfolio in Two-sided
Market:
Platform Merchandised Brands
versus Directly Retailed Brands
Abstract
We examine the hybrid business model for an intermediary acting as both a "merchant"
and a "two-sided platform". The dual role of the platform naturally divides the brands
into two groups: platform merchandised brands and directly retailed brands. While the
platform makes a profit by merchandising and rent-collecting from the affi liated direct
retailers, we explicitly explore the trade-offs between the two. Our analysis shows that in a
hybrid mode the platform extracts all the surpluses from the producers of the merchandised
brands, and the merchandised brands are always priced higher than the directly retailed
ones. We also show that, as the platform absorbs an existing directly retailed brand into
the self-brand portfolio, the equilibrium prices of both brand types are increased. We
find that when the platform’s capacity is relatively small, only the directly retailed brands
dominate the market; and when the capacity is relatively large both brand types coexist
in the marketplace.
Furthermore, we find a backward bending proportion plus a vertical proportion of the
"contract curve" in comparative statics analysis. That is, when the platform increases its
capacity, the self-brand portfolio always expands, whereas the third-party-brand portfolio
shrinks until it reaches a certain level. When there is indirect network effect in consumer
demand and positive expected surplus for consumers, the platform is better off; whereas
the direct retailers are worse off.
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2.1 Introduction
In our economy, consumers are becoming increasingly dependent on one-stop shopping for its
unbeatable features of cost-effi ciency and convenience. For traditional shopping, many people
will still visit the same nearby supermarket chain (e.g. Tesco, Sainsbury’s) or the same shopping
mall for daily/weekly purchases. For those who feel more comfortable shopping in pajamas at
the desk, they regularly go to the online stores (e.g. Tesco Direct, Amazon.com, eBay, Argos)
in search of the goods they want to consume. In all these cases, the consumers must join a
certain market platform in order to gain the access to the final goods.
In this sense, it is the market platform that connects the tens of millions of consumers to the
tens of thousands of brands. Taking a closer look, the market intermediation can be classified
into two forms (Hagiu, 2007):
(1) "Intermediary as a middleman (or merchant)", which buys goods from sellers and resells
to buyers, e.g. supermarket chains and other traditional stores. They make a profit by exploiting
the price difference between wholesaling and retailing.
(2) "Intermediary as a two-sided platform", which allows third-party retailers to sell directly
to the buyers visiting the same platform. Shopping malls and eBay are the most prominent
examples, and they profit by collecting membership fees (or rents) from these affi liated direct
retailers.
However, a number of market organisations have undertaken the transition from a pure
"merchant" or "two-sided platform" to a hybrid one. For example, Amazon.com initially started
as an online bookstore, but it has expanded the range of its merchandise at a surprising rate
over the past few years. More interestingly, meanwhile, it started to allow the independent
direct retailers to do business on the same platform (which is called Amazon Marketplace) at
a fee. Another digital giant, Apple, on the one hand has expanded its iTunes products from
the c/99 song to the $1.99 TV episode ($2.99 for an HD version), and similar with many other
applications; and on the other hand accommodates a huge variety of third-party developers
who sell their own applications in the same online App Store. Moreover, a large proportion
of the traditional supermarket sector now both accommodate the directly retailed brands on
the shelves at some rental fee, whilst also absorbing more product lines into their self-brand
portfolio1 (e.g. "Finest" range for Tesco and "Taste the Difference" range for Sainsbury’s). In
this chapter, we will show the rationale behind this trend from the perspective of the platform
owners.
In the case of the hybrid business model, the platform’s profits come from two main sources:
(1) the profits from wholesaling and retailing the merchandised brands (also referred to as the
self-brand portfolio); (2) the rents collected from the affi liated direct retailers on the platform.
1This is also referred to as Category or Brand Management in marketing literature.
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Unlike the pure "merchant" or the pure "two-sided platform" business model, the dual role of
the hybrid platform naturally divides the brands into two groups (i.e. the self-brand portfolio
and the third-party-brand portfolio), and there is potential competing conflict between the two.
Thus, there is no straightforward answer as to whether the directly retailed brand is friend or
foe to the platform.
In many cases, neither the pure "merchant" nor the pure "two-sided platform" business
model is optimal for the platform if the intermediary choice in between is an option. The
intuition is straightforward: As a pure "merchant", the platform might have the incentive to
rent out existing or additional slots to the direct retailers for more profits. As a pure "two-sided
platform", the intermediary might be lured by the high profit margin earned by the individual
retailers, and engage itself as "merchant" for a select range of products. It is still far from clear
what a platform’s optimal strategy might look like, and it will soon lose its tractability if we
focus only on the direct choice variables (i.e. the wholesaling prices and the admission fees.)
Using a simple model in this chapter, we claim that the platform effectively controls the
brand portfolio composite by setting the wholesale price and the admission fees. Without losing
sight of the whole picture, we take steps to address what the optimal brand portfolio is for the
platform in this context.
In the first subsection, we discuss the case where the platform is restricted to host only a cer-
tain variety of brands. We formalise the trade-offs between the "intermediary-as-a-middleman"
and the "intermediary-as-a-two-sided-platform" business model from the perspective of the plat-
form owner. We show that the pure "two-sided platform" mode dominates the hybrid mode
when the platform’s hosting capacity is under a certain level; and we show that both brand
types coexist on the platform when its hosting capacity is above a certain level.
We give a detailed discussion on the hybrid model, and show that the platform merchandised
brands are always priced higher than the directly retailed ones. Additionally, the platform
always bids for the merchandises at the marginal cost, and hence extracts all the surpluses
from the producers of the merchandised brands. We also examine the platform’s incentive for
absorbing one more merchandised brand at a fixed level of brand variety. Our analysis shows
that, as the platform includes an existing directly retailed brand into its own self-brand portfolio,
the equilibrium prices of both brand types are increased. It is beneficial to the platform in a
sense that its self-brand portfolio now earns a higher profit margin, and also it can extract more
rent from the affi liated direct retailers who now similarly earn a higher profit margin. However,
the hybrid platform will not endlessly absorb all the brands into its self-brand portfolio since
the platform has to balance the negative impact on demand that is brought by the rising price
level.
In the second subsection, we are interested in comparative statics with respect to the plat-
form’s accommodating capacity since it captures some intuition about the dynamics of the
6
optimal brand portfolio as the scale of the platform expands. It is interesting to find that when
the intermediary increases its capacity the self-brand portfolio always expands, whereas the
third-party-brand portfolio shrinks until it reaches a certain level.
In the third subsection, we investigate how indirect network effect in consumer demand
affects our previous results. It is shown that, if the expected surplus for the consumer is
positive, the indirect network effect makes the platform owner better off but the direct retailers
worse off.
Finally, we examine how the value of the outside option affects the optimal brand mix at
every level of brand variety. We find that the pure "merchant" mode is preferred only when
the outside option is not at all attractive.
2.1.1 Literature Review
Since the proposed framework in this chapter connects the pure "intermediary-as-a-middleman"
and the pure "intermediary-as-a-two-sided-platform" model, there are essentially three separate
strands of economics research contributing to this.
There is rich literature on the micro-structure of the market organisation with middlemen
intermediating between buyers and sellers. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) propose that the
middleman who buys a good from one individual and sells to another at a higher price can
be active in market when competing with the possible direct exchange in a random matching
process. Spulber (1996) allows competition among middlemen when buyers and sellers search
across them. Rust and Hall (2001) distinguish between the two competing types of intermediar-
ies: "middlemen" (dealers/brokers) —whose price quotes are private information and can only
be obtained by costly search process —and "market-makers" (specialists) —who post publicly
observable bid and ask prices. We assume in this chapter that all the prices quoted are public in-
formation but do not distinguish the use of terminology of either middleman or market-makers;
instead, we call them "merchants". Additionally, we assume that, on the one hand, there is
no difference in search cost for the consumers once the products are brought on board by the
middleman or by the direct retailers; and on the other hand, the search cost is punitively high
for the consumer if he/she stays off board.
There is also burgeoning literature on the intermediation of two-sided platform, which em-
phasises the indirect network effects. In this type of market, the agents on each side of the
market benefit from joining the same platform and interacting with the other side. Therefore
the platform can make profit by charging from the agents on both sides of the market. Rochet
and Tirole (2006) distinguish between membership charges and usage charges, and provide a
model integrating the externalities exerted by the two and unifying these two seemingly differ-
ent strands of literature. Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006) explain the pricing
structure of a monopoly platform and also examine the competition amongst the two-sided plat-
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forms. Virtually all the papers on the two-sided market focus on the pricing structure decided
by the platform. In this chapter we consider a monopolist platform model but only focus on the
subscription fee imposed on the affi liated direct retailers, rather than buyers2 . Additionally, we
look at the bidding price set by the platform for the merchandised brands, as we mainly discuss
the hybrid mode.
Furthermore, there is one additional strand of literature that tries to uncover the trade-offs
between the above mentioned two distinctive business models. The most closely related paper
is “Merchant or Two-Sided Platform?” by Hagiu (2007). He compares two polar strategies
for market intermediation which he names "merchant" mode and "two-sided platform" mode.
While most of the literature on the two-sided market takes the indirect network effect as given,
he argues that the belief on realisation of this effect is crucial to retailers’decisions of whether
or not to affi liate. Consequently, the merchant mode is always preferred as the indirect net-
work externalities will be fully internalised by the intermediary’s buy-out contract. Hagiu also
claims that the investment incentives and asymmetric information might lead to the opposite
optimal strategy: being a pure "two-sided platform". Therefore, the strategic decision for the
intermediary is not a 0-1 notion but a position along this continuum. In spite of the similar
result of a hybrid optimal strategy, our model differs from theirs in that we endogenise the
participating decision for the sellers by allowing them to choose between simply selling to the
middleman or directly to consumers. This is a crucial point in this chapter. More importantly,
without the additional assumptions in Hagiu’s model, we argue that the existence of the optimal
hybrid strategy for the intermediary being both a middleman and a two-sided platform should
be mainly attributed to the presence of the outside option for the producers.
There is other relevant literature that bears similar intuition to this chapter. Nocke, et.
al. (2007) develop a model comparing the impact of monopoly and dispersed ownership of the
platform. The former coincides with the conventional setup of a monopoly two-sided platform,
while in the latter case the platform ownership has been assigned to a certain group of sellers
who have the vote to decide the admission fee and effectively influence the entry of other sellers.
It is interesting to see that their model and ours are in fact two sides of the same coin. That
is, their model is drawn from the viewpoint of the dispersed owners who are entitled to a fixed
proportion of the market; while ours is from the perspective of a monopoly platform owner who
is flexible in deciding any combination of merchandised brands and directly retailed brands
in its portfolio. Additionally, this chapter is related to the literature on competition among
a multi-product firm and many single-product firms in a differentiated market (e.g. Giraud-
Heraud et. al. ,2003), despite the fact that in our model the "multi-product firm" (or the
platform) also collects rental fees from other single-product firms and has to internalise the
2We assume zero access price to the consumers since it is not feasible to charge buyers upon entry for most
of the retailing business.
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relevant externalities.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. The basic model is presented in Section 2.2, and the
results of the equilibrium analysis are shown in Section 2.3. There we discuss the existence of
the optimal brand portfolio, and analyse the platform’s incentive to absorb one more existing
directly retailed brand at a fixed level of brand variety (Subsection 2.3.1). We show the res-
ults of the comparative statics with respect to the intermediary’s accommodating capacity in
Subsection 2.3.2; and we discuss how the indirect network effect in consumer demand and the
value of the outside option affect our results in Subsection 2.3.3 and Subsection 2.3.4. Section
2.4 concludes.
2.2 The Model
It is a product market that is played by three types of agents: platform, sellers and buyers.
The products: The products are horizontally differentiated in an infinitely large menu of
brands indexed by i, i = 1, 2, ...,∞. For brand i, it incurs a distribution cost of g(i) to make
its goods available in the market. If we list the menu of brands in the ascending order of
the distribution cost, g(i) is an increasing function that is common knowledge to all, and is
independent of demand. Additionally, there is a constant marginal cost c common to all brands.
The platform: In a two-sided market, the platform normally charges positive or negative3
subscription fees to the agents on either side of the market. For simplicity, we ignore the
admission fee imposed on the consumers and restrict ourselves to the choice of charging only
membership fee r to sellers. In addition to the conventional setup in the two-sided market,
we formulate that the platform can join the retailing channel by merchandising; that is, the
platform purchases brand i from the seller at a universal wholesale price pw and then sells to
the buyers at price poi ; however, at the same time it has to take care of the relevant distribution
cost g(i) for the merchandised brand i.4 Meanwhile, the platform collects the membership fee
r from the affi liated direct retailers who do business on the platform and cover the distribution
costs themselves.
Buyers: There is a continuum of buyers with unit measure. The buyers pay a visit to the
platform for the end products which are horizontally differentiated in brands. Each buyer can
choose to purchase only a single unit of one of the brands, or not. The utility for a typical buyer
l purchasing brand i is vli = v− pi + εli. v is the systematic value that each buyer receives from
consuming any of the brands; pi is the price per product for brand i; εli denotes the idiosyncratic
3Negative tariffs can be subsidies.
4We assume that the platform is no more effi cient than the individual direct retailers in dealing with the
distribution costs. There are cases where the wholesaler is more effi cient due to the economies of scale; these
are not discussed in this paper.
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taste that the buyer l has about brand i.5 The buyer decides to purchase one product of brand
i if and only if its net utility exceeds that of all other brands and exceeds zero, (which is the
utility of non-purchasing). Thus, the mass of consumers who finally make purchases can be
denoted as D(p) where p is the vector of the market prices.
Sellers: Each brand is controlled by a unique seller. There are two ways (i.e. Plan A and B
as follows) for brand i to be available on the platform, or the seller goes to the outside option
which yields a payoff of (Ω− g(i)).
i) Plan A. The seller i pays a membership fee r to do business on the platform, but he/she still
needs to cover the distribution cost himself/herself. The payoff is thus D(p)qsi (p
s
i −c)−r−g(i),
where qsi is the market share of the brand under Plan A.
ii) Plan B. He/she simply chooses to wholesale his/her brand of products to the platform
at price pw leaving the retailing business to the platform. As he/she neither needs to pay the
admission fees nor to incur any distribution costs, the payoff is D(p)qoi (p
w − c), where qoi is the
market share of brand i under Plan B.
Now we have two types of brands. Let us call those under Plan A directly retailed brands
and denote their number by ns; and call those under Plan B platform merchandised brands
and denote their number by no. Also, we are using superscripts s and o to indicate the directly





i (the subscript i is the index of the brand). It is obvious to note that the price
vector p itself already contains the information of the brand composite, i.e. ns and no.
Timing: We formulate the decisions of the agents in the following sequential game, involving
first the platform, then the sellers, and finally the buyers:
Stage 1. The owner of the platform decides to accommodate a total of n brands on the
platform, and posts a bidding price pw for wholesaling as well as a flat membership fee r for all
prospective sellers.
Stage 2. The sellers decide whether to pay membership fee to gain access to sell on the
platform (as described in Plan A), or to accept the bids from the platform (as Plan B), or to
simply go to the outside option. Thus, a market is formed featuring ns brands directly retailed
by independent sellers, together with no brands merchandised by the platform.
Stage 3. All the brands that entered in the second stage now enter monopolistic competition.
That is, the ns affi liated direct retailers non-cooperatively decide the prices of their brands and
simultaneously the platform decides the prices of its no merchandised brands.
Stage 4. By observing all the available brands as well as their prices in the market, the
buyers decide which product to buy, if any.
5 In the formal equilibrium analysis, we assume that εli is independently and identically double exponentially
distributed as commonly seen in Multinomial Logit literature.
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2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Now let us proceed into the equilibrium analysis of the model.
To begin with we look at the decision of the marginal seller. Since the platform posts a
single wholesale price pw, those who go with Plan B will all make same profit, which equals the
profit of the marginal seller im who is indifferent between taking Plan A and Plan B. That is
D(p)qoim(p
w − c) = D(p)qsim(psim − c)− r − g(im) (2.1)
⇒ r = D(p)(qsimpsim − qoimpw − qsimc+ qoimc)− g(im) (2.2)
Suppose this marginal seller always chooses to go to Plan A, then we have
ns = im
Next, it is relatively easy to check that the brands of the same group (i.e. the merchandised
brands or the directly retailed brands) follow symmetric pricing strategy in equilibrium, since
they all have identical constant marginal cost and face the same market conditions. That is
psi = p
s, qsi = q
s
poj = p
o, qoj = q
o
where i = 1, ..., ns and j = ns + 1, ..., ns + no
Now (2.2) can be rewritten as
r = D(p)(qsps − qopw − qsc+ qoc)− g(ns) (2.3)
It is easy to comprehend that in Stage 2 the sellers (or the corresponding brands) with low
distribution costs would opt for direct retailing, while those with higher costs would prefer their
brands to be merchandised. Recall that once a seller chooses to wholesale his/her products to
the platform, it is no longer the seller but the platform that is responsible for the distribution
costs. As a result, the brands with index i = 1, ..., ns are directly retailed by the individual
third-party sellers; the brands with index j = ns + 1, ..., ns + no are merchandised by the
platform; and the brands with index higher than (ns +no) are kept away from the marketplace
since the platform has committed to host a total of (ns + no) brand variety in Stage 1.
Additionally, the marginal sellers can be identified by observing the information announced
in Stage 1. By backward induction, the market share for each brand (i.e. qs and qo) is determined
by the price p set in the previous stage. Then in Stage 3, p (i.e. ps and po but NOT pw) is
uniquely determined by the market participation (i.e. ns directly retailed brands and no platform
merchandised brands) formed in the previous stage. Thus, D(p), qs, qo and ps in (2.2) can
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all be stated in terms of ns and no. We note that the marginal brand im (which equals ns) is
determined by n, pw and r set by the platform in the prior stage6 . In others words, the brand
mix is uniquely determined by the platform’s strategy in the first stage.
Next, let us come to the profit contribution for the platform of merchandising brand j. That
is
πoj = D(p)q
o(po − pw)− g(j)
Thus, the aggregate profit function for the platform can be stated as follows. It consists of
two parts: the membership fees collected from ns subscribed direct retailers, and the profits
from the other no merchandised brands. That is







[D(p)qo(po − pw)− g(j)] (2.5)
However, two cases need to be discussed separately if additional equilibrium results were to
be applied in the platform’s profit function. Suppose Ω > g(1).
Firstly, we look at the case when ns ≤ g−1(Ω), where g−1(Ω) is also denoted by nsΩ. We
note that it is optimal for the platform to set a membership fee that makes the sellers indifferent
between choosing Plan A and the outside option. That is
D(p)qs(ps − c)− r − g(i) = Ω− g(i) for all i ≤ nsΩ (2.6)
Combining (2.1) and (2.6), we obtain the expressions of pw and r as follows:





The intuition of (2.7) is that as the value of the outside option Ω increases, the platform will
have to lower the membership fee r to remain attractive. The intuition of (2.8) is that in order
to "persuade" more sellers to join the direct retailing force, the platform will have to lower the
wholesale price pw to make the merchandising option less attractive. Additionally, (2.8) implies
that pw ≥ c.
Now, the platform’s profit function (2.5) can be manipulated as follows by using (2.7) and
6This can be verified by establishing the simultaneous equations of (2.2) and ns + no = n.
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(2.8).
Π = D(p)nsqs(ps − c)− nsΩ +
ns+no∑
j=ns+1
[D(p)qo(po − pw)− g(j)]
= D(p)nsqs(ps − c)− nsΩ +
ns+no∑
j=ns+1








Secondly, we look at the case when ns > nsΩ. It is worth noting that (2.6) and (2.7) will
not apply in this case since the net payoff cannot be negative. However, it can be shown in the
following lemma that the platform always sets the wholesale price at the marginal cost.
Lemma 2.1 The platform always sets the wholesale price pw at the level of marginal cost c
when ns > nsΩ.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition here is that by setting the wholesale price as low as the marginal cost the
platform has effectively "pushed" a larger proportion of seller to join the third-party-brand
portfolio. As a result, the platform extracts all the surpluses from the producers of the mer-
chandised brands.
By using the result of Lemma 2.1 that pw = c, (2.3) can be simplified to
r = D(p)(qsps − qsc)− g(ns) (2.10)
Substituting for r in (2.5) by using (2.10), the platform’s profit function can be rewritten as
Π = [D(p)(qsps − qsc)− g(ns)]ns +
ns+no∑
j=ns+1
[D(p)qo(po − c)− g(j)]




Now we have derived two groups of expressions, i.e. (2.4) and (2.9)(2.11), to describe the
platform’s profits. Both ways bear their own merit.
The profit function (2.4) is straightforward in a sense that each argument represents the
source of profits from a certain group of brands.
The profit functions (2.9) and (2.11) can be interpreted in another way without losing the
intuition. The first terms in (2.9) and (2.11) are identical, and can be referred to as the
"gross profits" (i.e. the profits gross of distribution costs but net of variable costs) generated
from both brand types. In order to facilitate our analysis later, let us define Ψ(ns, no) =
D(p)(nsqsps + noqopo − c). The last two terms in (2.9) and (2.11) are the "costs", which
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include the distribution costs plus the profits that go to the direct retailers and the wholesalers.
More specifically, the shaded areas under curve g(i) in B in Figure 2.1 represent the distribution
costs burdened by the platform for merchandising. The shaded area between curve g(i) and
[g(i) + Ω− g(ns)] in Figure 2.1(a) is the surplus that goes to the producers of the merchandised
brands. The shaded area A represents the profits (gross of distribution costs and membership
fees) required by the direct retailers to join the platform rather than going to the outside
options. Moreover, it can be interpreted as all the distribution costs incurred (i.e. the shaded
area under curve g(i)), plus the profit that the platform has to give away to both direct retailer
and producers of the merchandised brands (i.e. the shaded area above curve g(i)), if any.
Figure 2.1: (a) "Costs" for the platform when ns ≤ nsΩ; (b) when ns > nsΩ
As a matter of fact, the platform decides its optimal level of brand variety n, the wholesale
price pw and the membership fee r in the first stage, taking into account how they will affect
competition and profits for all parties in the third and fourth stage and thus the self-selection
of sellers in the second stage. Consequently, we can view the platform’s planning and pricing
problem for admission as its controlling problem over the equilibrium market participation
for both directly retailed brands and platform merchandised ones. We establish the following
proposition to summarise all these.
Proposition 2.1 The problem faced by the platform when deciding the total variety of brands
n, the wholesale price pw and the membership fee r can be expressed as a problem of effectively
choosing the range of directly retailed brands ns and the range of platform merchandised brands
no. Formally, this problem can be written as
max
ns,no
{D(p)(nsqsps + noqopo − c)− (ns + no)πx −
ns+no∑
j=ns+1
[g(j)− g(ns)]} when ns ≤ nsΩ
max
ns,no
{D(p)(nsqsps + noqopo − c)− nsg(ns)−
ns+no∑
j=ns+1
g(j)]} when ns > nsΩ
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where D(·), ps and po, qs and qo are well defined as functions of ns and no.
Let us go back and explore a bit further the mass of the consumers who eventually make
purchases. As we mentioned before, a buyer purchases a brand only if net utility derived exceeds
that of all other brands and is non-negative. Given the vector of prices p set in the previous
stage, the expected per capita demand for brand i can be written as follows:





Recall that the indirect utility function for a typical buyer l purchasing brand i is vli =
v − pi + εli. We assume that εli, the stochastic term of consumer l’s utility function, is inde-
pendently and identically distributed according to a type-1 Extreme Value (EV) distribution
with location parameter zero and scale parameter µ.7 Here, µ can be interpreted as a para-
meter of substitutability among the brands. Using the EV distribution is appealing because it
is closely related to the familiar logit model, which can be conveniently modified to allow for a
no-purchase alternative. Another rationale for using EV distribution as a preference parameter
is "to keep the demand structure analytically tractable" (Jain, et. al., 1994). Also, Dolan (1995)
gives empirical evidence that the reservation prices (which is the preference in our model) for
different but related items often have symmetric distributions with the same shape. While the
extreme value distribution is not exactly symmetric, it can be viewed as an approximation to
the Normal distribution.
Given the indirect utility function of consumers and demand function (2.12), the per capita
demand for brand i can be written as follows8 .
xi(p, n) = [
e(v−pi)/µ
M



















7The EV (0, µ) distribution is unimodal with mode zero and is skewed to the right. Its cumulative distribution
and density functions are given by
F (x) = exp{−e−x/µ}
f(x) = µ−1e−x/µF (x)
8Based on the indirect utility function we’ve stated earlier for the consumers and the monopolistic competition
among brands, we are actually using the Multinomial Logit Demand.
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We write qi for qi(p) in the following paragraphs for the sake of brevity, but keep in mind
that market share is shaped by market prices p which is determined by (ns, no).
The second term in the square brackets of (2.13) indicates the market demand D(p), which
is the mass of consumers that finally make successful purchases. It is worthwhile to remember













Next, we characterise the pricing strategy for each party in Stage 3.
The profit function for the direct retailer with brand i is
πsi = D(p)(p
s − c)qs − r − g(i)
The best response function for the direct retailer can be obtained by differentiating the above
function with respect to ps. Suppose that the individual brands ignore their impact on the
market demand D(p), as supported by Chamberlin’s discussion of "large group" equilibrium.
Also, since r and g(i) have already been incurred in the previous stage, we are effectively
searching for the derivative of (ps − c)qs. Thus, the first order condition can be obtained as
follows by using (2.15) and (2.16).




(ps − c)qs(qs − 1)
µ
= 0 (2.17)
Rearranging the above, we obtain an implicit best response function for the direct retailers.
That is
ps − c = µ
1− qs (2.18)
Next, let us turn to the pricing strategy for platform merchandised brands. Similarly, we
are effectively searching for the derivative of (nsqsps + noqopo). However, we need to note that
the best response for the merchandised brands cannot be obtained by simply differentiating it
with respect to po9 . Instead we need to separate a brand j from the no merchandised brands
9Differentiating (nsqsps + noqopo) with respect to po would indicate simultaneous price change of all mer-
chandised brands. In this case, we cannot ignore their joint impact on the market demand D(p) and the "large
group" assumption breaks down.
16























(no − 1)poi qoi qoj
µ
= 0 (2.19)
where i 6= j
In equilibrium all the prices (market shares) of the merchandised brands shall be same.
After a bit more simplification, we obtain a neat implicit best response function for the platform
merchandised brands:





Since noqo is strictly less than unity in the context of a mixed brand portfolio, it is straight-
forward to have the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1 The platform merchandised brands are always priced higher than the directly
retailed brands; that is, po > ps.
The intuition of Corollary 2.1 is that, on the one hand, the platform has no incentive to
undercut the directly retailed brands, as it would lower the profit margin of the "seemingly
rival" brands which contribute to the platform’s profit in terms of the membership fees. On the
other hand, the platform merchandised brands face less competition than the directly retailed
brands since the pricing strategy of the former is under the control of a single ownership (i.e.
the platform)10 .
Alternatively, Corollary 2.1 can also be understood in the following way:
We learn from the difference between the reaction functions (2.19) and (2.17) that the
(upward-sloping) best response curve of the platform merchandised brand is the rightward
shifted mirror image of the best response curve of the directly retailed brand (as illustrated in
Figure 2.2). It can be easily implied from the figure that the platform merchandised brands
always charge a price premium.
2.3.1 Existence of the Optimal Brand Portfolio
In this subsection, we examine the existence of the optimal brand portfolio with a fixed level
of brand variety, i.e. ns + no = n̄. The virtue of adopting a fixed brand variety is obvious: on
the one hand, it helps to separate the indirect network effect in consumer demand which would
complicate the analysis from the very beginning; on the other hand, it allows us to scrutinise
10This intuition of price premium here is in line with the concept of "price shield" suggested by Giraud-Heraud
et. al. (2003) in the context of competition among a multi-product firm and many single-product firms.
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of the equilibrium prices of the two brand types
the platform’s incentive for whether or not to absorb one more brand to merchandise. Also in
the following analysis, we ignore the integer constraints and treat the number of the directly
retailed brands ns as continuous variables, where ns ∈ 0 ∪ [1, n̄];11 and treat the distribution
cost g(i) as a continuous function, where i ∈ [1, n̄].
If the number of brands are in hundreds or thousands, the continuous function of the distri-
bution cost is a good proxy of the discrete problem. Thus, the results derived in the previous
subsection still hold. Recall from Corollary 2.1 that the platform merchandised brands charge
a higher price than the directly retailed ones. It implies the latter enjoys a larger market share
than the former. Then, if an existing directly retailed brand were to be absorbed by the plat-
form (i.e. ns decreases while no increases), we would anticipate its price to be inflated and
market share lowered. Meanwhile, it would leave more market share to its rivals and allow
them also to raise their prices a little bit. The overall effect is that all prices would be inflated
(but the prices of the counterparts would not rise as much) and the per customer "gross profits"
enhanced as the platform absorbs more brands to merchandise while keeping the total brand
variety fixed. However, the mass of the consumers shrinks as a result of being discouraged
by the price inflation. We establish the following lemma to summarise the movements of the
relevant market variables.
Lemma 2.2 With a fixed brand variety on the platform (i.e. ns + no = n̄),
(i) the prices charged for both the platform merchandised brands (i.e. po) and the directly
retailed brands (i.e. ps), and the price premium for the merchandised brands (i.e. po − ps)
11 It is important to note that ns /∈ (0, 1), otherwise the reaction functions will be undefined for the market
competitors in the Multinomial Logit Setups.
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decrease in ns;
(ii) the market share for each platform merchandised brand (i.e. qo) and for each directly
retailed brand (i.e. qs)12 decrease in ns;
(iii) the market share for platform merchandising (direct retailing), i.e. noqo (nsqs), de-
creases (increases) in ns;
(iv) the market demand D(ns, n̄− ns) increases in ns;
(v) the "gross profits" per consumer (i.e. nsqsps + noqopo − c) decreases in ns;
(vi) the "costs" (i.e. (ns + no)Ω +
n̄∫
ns
[g(j) − g(ns)]dj) decrease in ns when ns ≤ nsΩ; while
the "costs" (i.e. nsg(ns) +
n̄∫
ns
g(i)di) increase in ns when ns > nsΩ.
(NB: All the above relations with respect to no are just the opposite since no = n̄− ns)
Proof. By using (2.14), equation (2.20) can be expanded as
po − ps = µ


















µ ) > 0, we can conclude that
d(po−ps)
dns < 0.
By using (2.20) and monotonicity, it can be further implied that dq
o
dns < 0.




µ ). By using the subconclu-
sions above, it implies dq
s
dns < 0.
Then, we arrive at ∂p
s
∂ns < 0 by using (2.18); as well as
∂po
∂ns < 0 by using (2.20). So far, we
have proved (i) and (ii) in the lemma.
It is also straightforward to arrive at (iii) from (ii).
Next, let us turn toD(ns, n̄−ns), the mass of the consumers who eventually make purchases.
We have










∂ns < 0 in Lemma 2.2 (i) and
∂qo
∂ns < 0 in (ii). By using monotonicity it can be
shown that D(ns, n̄− ns) increases in ns.
For (v), by using (2.18) and (2.20), the "gross profits" per consumer can be simplified as
12Here qo and qs are not infinitesimally small if n is finite.
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follows.
nsqsps + noqopo − c = po − µ− c (2.23)
Since po decreases in ns (Lemma 2.2 (i)), it is straightforward that the "gross profits" (i.e.
nsqsps + noqopo − c) decreases in ns.
For the last statement in the lemma, we can write as follows the derivative of the "costs"






= −(n̄− ns)g′(ns) < 0 (2.24)
The negative sign of the above derivative indicates that when ns ≤ nsΩ the "costs" decrease
in ns. It can also be implied from the change in the shaded area in Figure 2.1 (a).






= nsg′(ns) > 0 (2.25)
The positive sign of the above derivative indicates that when ns > nsΩ the "costs" increase
in ns. It can also be implied from the change in the shaded area in Figure 2.1 (b).
Here we have completed all the proofs in Lemma 2.2.
The intuition of Lemma 2.2 is relatively easy to grasp. Since its profits come from mer-
chandising and renting, the platform can more credibly commit to putting up higher prices of
its merchandised brands by holding a larger stake in the retailing market, which justifies its
incentive to merchandise more brands. Moreover, due to the complementarity nature of prices,
the directly retailed brands are priced higher, while their counterparts (i.e. the merchandised
brands) are priced even higher as the platform enriches its self-brand portfolio. Additionally,
we find the coexistence of the widened price discrepancy between the two brand groups and an
increase in market share for each brand, which is unusual and might be of interest to discuss
more.
From the "gross profits" side, Lemma 2.2 (v) justifies the platform’s incentive to expand
the range of the merchandised brands. However, we also need to note that the expansion in
the platform’s self-brand portfolio pushes up the market prices and will in turn dampen the
consumers’motivation to visit the platform in the first place (Lemma 2.2 (iv)). Therefore, it
implies an optimal mix of platform merchandised brands and directly retailed brands for the
platform.
The last statement in Lemma 2.2 captures the intuition on the "costs" side for the platform
(see the illustration in Figure 2.1). It is easy to check from Figure 2.1 (a) and (b) that the
platform tends to keep the "costs" low at ns = nsΩ.
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A formal claim on the existence as well as the type of equilibrium will be presented in
Proposition 2.2. Before that, we need to establish Corollary 2.2 to have a more detailed char-
acterisation of the "gross profits" side function for the platform.
Corollary 2.2 dΨ(n
s,n̄−ns)
dns |ns=1 > 0 and
d2
dns2 Ψ(n
s, n̄− ns) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 2.2 simply states that Ψ is concave and the slope of Ψ function at ns = 1 is always
positive. It is worth noting that the suffi cient condition to yield a unique equilibrium is that




Recall that we are now discussing the case where ns ∈ [1, n̄]; it helps to have the following
definition by using the derivative of upward-sloping part of the "costs" function (2.25).
Definition 2.1 The threshold scale of the brand portfolio n̄0 is implicitly defined by
∂Ψ(ns, n̄0 − ns)
∂ns
|ns=n̄0 = n̄0g′(n̄0) (2.26)
Figure 2.3: (a)The "gross profits" and "costs" for the platform when n̄ is relatively small;
(b)when n̄ is relatively large.
From Figure 2.3 (a) it is not diffi cult to justify the existence of a corner solution at ns = n̄0
when n̄ ≤ n̄0; and from Figure 2.3 (b) the existence of an interior solution when n̄ > n̄0. This
can be summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2 (i) If n̄ ≤ n̄0 (i.e. when the platform’s capacity is relatively small), only the
directly retailed brands dominate the market in equilibrium;
(ii) If n̄ > n̄0 (i.e. when the platform’s capacity is relatively large), both the platform
merchandised brands and the directly retailed brands coexist in the marketplace.
Proposition 2.2 is the main result of this subsection. It implies that when a platform’s scale
is small it would favour a pure two-sided business model, since the marginal "gross profits"
brought by a directly retailed brand rather than a merchandised brand exceeds its marginal
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"costs"; and when a platform’s scale is large, it would be tempted to replace some directly
retailed brands with merchandised ones, since now it is able to share the high profit margins
by merchandising, leaving less surplus to the direct retailers.
We note that the interior solution ns∗ is always greater than nsΩ. Thus, we learn from
Lemma 2.1 that, the platform always sets the wholesale price at the marginal cost and extracts
all the surplus from the producers of the merchandised brands in the hybrid business model.
The following numerical example helps us to have a glimpse of the equilibrium market profile
of the two cases in Proposition 2.2.
Example 2.1 Given that the total variety of brands on the platform is fixed at (a) ns + no =
n̄ = 4 and (b) ns + no = n̄ = 10, the constant marginal cost c = 0.1, the parameter of brand
substitutability µ = 0.1, the value of the outside option Ω = 3/5000, the systematic value of the
brands v = 10
1/2
50 , and the distribution cost g(x) = x/5000. Then the optimal portfolio for the
platform and the relevant market profile is displayed in Table 2.1.
n̄ no ns po ps qo qs D Πo∗
Case (a) 4 0 4 n/a 0.233 n/a 0.250 0.839 0.06909
Case (b) 10 5.70 4.30 0.355 0.221 0.045 0.173 0.698 0.09656
Table 2.1: The optimal brand portfolios when n̄ = 4 and when n̄ = 10
We note that nsΩ = g
−1(Ω) = g−1(3/5000) = 3.
Moreover, recall that n̄0 is defined by equation (2.26), thus, the threshold level of capacity
for the platform in this example can be derived by using (2.33) in the Appendix. That is

















































⇒ n̄0 = 4.71
It can be verified that the results in Table 2.1 coincide with the threshold levels of capacity
derived here.
2.3.2 Comparative Statics w.r.t. the Hosting Capacity
In this subsection, we focus on the comparative statics with respect to the total brand variety
under Proposition 2.2 (ii) (i.e. n̄ > n̄0). It helps us to gain some intuition about the dynamics
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of optimal brand portfolio when the platform’s hosting capacity n̄ expands. Our analysis shows
a backward bending proportion plus a vertical proportion of the "contract curve"; that is,
when the platform’s accommodating capacity n̄ expands from n̄0, the optimum number of the
platform merchandised brands no always increases while that of the directly retailed brands ns
decreases until it reaches nsΩ.
Recall the best response functions of the two brand types (2.18) and (2.20), which can be
expanded as
po − ps = µn
o
ns
exp[−(po − ps)/µ] + µ (2.27)
ps − c = µ/[1− 1
no exp[−(po − ps)/µ] + ns ] (2.28)
Here is a system of two equations with four unknowns: po and ps, no and ns. We could
solve for po and ps in terms of no and ns13 . And the optimal portfolio of the brands could be
identified by solving the above two-dimensional optimisation as described in Proposition 2.1.
However, the problem lies in the fact that there is no closed-form solution for (po−ps) in (2.27).
We concluded in the previous subsection that there exists a unique equilibrium for every
level of brand variety (e.g. Ens+no and Ens+no+1 on the −45o lines). Connecting the Es we
obtain a "contract curve" (see the illustration of the curve in Figure 2.4). Thus, identifying the
optimal brand portfolio in the hybrid mode case is no more than finding the brand portfolio
along the "contract curve" that gives the highest profits for the platform. However, the direct
analysis of the change from Ens+no to Ens+no+1, for instance, would be too complex due to the
endogeneity of such intermediary variables as po and ps which can not be explicitly expressed
in terms of the choice variables no and ns. Nonetheless, in the following paragraphs we provide
a novel way to decompose the effect of the change from Ens+no to Ens+no+1.
Firstly, we establish Corollary 2.3 to answer a simpler question as to how Ψ, the "gross
profits" for the platform, responds to the platform’s shift of its portfolio from Ens+no to
E′ns+no+1, i.e. the platform fills in a newly added slot with platform merchandised brand
holding the number of the directly retailed brands constant14 . Secondly, we consider the im-
pact on the "gross profits" for the platform Ψ from portfolio E′ns+no+1 to Ens+no+1 which is
the optimal portfolio when the platform’s scale is (ns + no + 1).
We show in Corollary 2.3 that Ψ(ns, no + 1) > Ψ(ns, no). That is, Ψ curve shifts upward as
the platform’s accommodating capacity expands (see Figure 2.5).
Corollary 2.3 Ψ(ns, no) increases in no, holding ns constant; that is, with a fixed variety of the
directly retailed brands, the "gross profits" increase in the variety of the platform merchandised
brands.
13We can first solve for (po−ps) in terms of no and ns from equation (2.27), and then substitute it into (2.28)
to solve for ps. Thus, po and ps are both solved in terms of no and ns.
14 In order to simplify the analysis, here we treat the brand numbers as discrete.
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of the optimal brand mix at each fixed level of brand variety
Proof. See Appendix.
It is worthwhile to note the difference between the statements in Corollary 2.2 and Corollary
2.3. The former describes how Ψ responds to the change in the composite of market brands by
holding the total variety constant, while the latter describes the case by holding the variety of
the directly retailed brands constant.
We show in Corollary 2.4 that, when the platform’s accommodating capacity expands, the




s, n̄− ns) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 2.4 states that the sensitivity of the portfolio composite to the "gross profits" at
every level is mitigated/diluted by the expanding portfolio scale.
Meanwhile, let us turn to the "costs" side of the platform. We learn from (2.24) that when
ns ≤ nsΩ the derivative of the "costs" decreases in the platform’s scale n̄ and from (2.25) that
when ns > nsΩ the "costs" are independent of n̄. It can be implied from Figure 2.5 that when
n̄ increases the optimum number of the directly retailed brands ns∗ decreases until it reaches
nsΩ. We summarise it in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3 As the platform’s accommodating capacity n̄ expands, the optimum number
of the platform merchandised brands no always increases, while the directly retailed brands ns
decreases until it reaches nsΩ.
Proposition 2.3 states that the "contract curve" has a backward bending proportion and
a vertical proportion. Combining Proposition 2.2 and Proposition 2.3, we can illustrate the
optimal brand portfolio for the platform for every level of brand variety n̄ (see the thick line in
Figure 2.6).
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Figure 2.5: The changes in the shape of the "gross profits" and "costs" curves when the total
brand variety increases
At first glance the backward bending "contract curve" seems to be counter-intuitive, as
many would anticipate the increase in both brand types when the platform was able to host
more brands. However, we need to note that as the marginal contribution of the directly retailed
brand on "gross profits" is diluted by the expanding capacity, the platform would choose to
accommodate more merchandised brands rather than directly retailed brands as it capacity
increases.
Note that the discussion in this subsection so far is based on the assumption that nsΩ < n̄0.
It is relatively easy to comprehend that the backward bending proportion of the "contract
curve" degenerates to the vertical proportion when nsΩ ≥ n̄0 (See the illustration in Figure 2.7).
The insight derived here is also supported by the empirical evidence. As platforms normally
use capacity expansion as one of the most important strategies,15 for those that accommodate
both brand types as we have discussed, many have witnessed an increasing weight and focus on
the merchandise (or the self-brands) in the brand portfolio. Among them, the most prominent
example is Amazon.com. Started as an online bookstore, Amazon.com has now expanded its
product lines into almost anything you can come up with. Meanwhile, it also reaps about
40 percent of its sales from the affi liated direct retailers who do business through "Amazon
Marketplace" by paying commission fees. As its accommodating capacity expands it is also
interesting to observe that, by offering warehouse space and/or logistic service at a relatively
15This strategy is more common for the virtual marketplaces online as they can easily expand the hosting
capacities by investing in more servers; and for the traditional business such as supermarket, it is able to increase
the capacity by more effi cient use of its shelves.
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Figure 2.6: Illustration of the "contract curve"
low cost to individual retailers, Amazon has in effect integrated these affi liated brands into its
merchandised brand portfolio. Amazon is not alone. Another Chinese online shopping portal,
TaoBao Marketplace is now refocusing its core business from its C2C merchants to B2C Taobao
Mall merchants. Our model sheds some light on the motivation beneath this trend, though it
can be attributed to other factors as well.
2.3.3 Discussion of Indirect Network Effect
Notice that our discussion so far has been restricted to the degenerated form of the systematic
value which is v. We are also interested in the impact of positive indirect network effect in
consumer demand (i.e. v = v(n̄) which increases in n̄)16 on the optimal portfolio for every
level of brand variety. In this subsection, we establish the following lemma to specify how our
previous results are affected by the introduction of indirect network effect in consumer demand.
This will be followed by a numerical example which compares the optimal brand portfolios with
and without the indirect network effect.
Lemma 2.3 When there is indirect network effect in consumer demand andM > 1, the optimal
portfolio will have more platform merchandised brands for every level of brand variety.
Proof. See Appendix.
We note that consumer demand is a monotonic transformation ofM , which isD(ns, n̄−ns) =
(1− e−M ). Thus, M can be viewed as an index of market demand. Also, recall the expression
of M , which is M = (n̄−ns)e(v(n̄)−po)/µ+nse(v(n̄)−ps)/µ where ns ∈ [1, n̄] and n̄ ≥ 2. It can be
16Or it can be attributed to the shorten "psychological distance" to the desirable brands when buyers have
more options available.
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Figure 2.7: Illustration of the "contract curve" when nsΩ ≥ n̄0.
shown that M is strictly greater than unity when v(n̄) > po and v(n̄) > ps. We note that these
two inequalities are true in the cases that the expected surplus for any consumer is positive.
Here, the effects are two fold: firstly, the market demand has been reinforced by the indirect
network effect as consumers welcome more variety of brands; secondly, when the consumer
demand is above a certain level (i.e. the index of market demandM exceeds unity), despite the
greater distribution costs to be incurred the platform is willing to merchandise more brands,
and hence is able to extract more surplus from the direct retailers (as Area A shrinks in Figure
2.1 (b)). As a result, with additional indirect network effect the platform is better off while the
direct retailers worse off. The effect on the optimal brand portfolio is displayed in Figure 2.8.
That is, the threshold level of scale n̄0 becomes smaller and the backward bending proportion
of the "contract curve" shifts leftward with the vertical proportion remaining still.
Figure 2.8: The impact of indirect network effect on the "contract curve" when M > 1
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Additionally, without the restriction on total brand variety as in Example 2.1 (i.e. no+ns =
n̄ = 10), we are able to numerically compare the optimal brand portfolio without indirect
network effect (i.e. v(n) = v = 10
1/2




n̄ no ns po ps qo qs D Π
Optimal brand mix w/o
indirect network effect 16.82 12.8 4.02 0.381 0.218 0.030 0.153 0.751 0.10578
Optimal brand mix with
indirect network effect 21.82 18.8 3.02 0.413 0.221 0.025 0.173 0.802 0.12183
Table 2.2: The comparison of the optimal brand portfolios with/without indirect network effect
It is not surprising to see from the above numerical example that neglecting the indirect
network effect will create a bias toward a smaller number of total brand varieties.
Recall that nsΩ = 3, which is smaller than the number of directly retailed brands in the op-
timal brand mix. Thus, the optimal brand portfolios in both cases are located on the backward
bending proportion of the "contract curve".
We learn from Table 2.2 that when we take the indirect network effect into account, the self-
brand portfolio expands, while the third-party-brand portfolio shrinks. Additionally, we can
also judge this issue in terms of the units sold rather than the variety available for each portfolio
type. We note that, as the per brand market share for directly retailed brands increases while
that for the platform-merchandised brands decreases17 , the gap in units sold turns out to be
not as large as that in brand variety.
2.3.4 Discussion of Outside Option




It can be implied that the backward bending proportion of the "contract curve" prolongs and
the vertical proportion shifts leftward with n̄0 unchanged when the outside option becomes less
attractive (see the illustration in Figure 2.9). And intuitively, the platform is able to extract
more surplus from the direct retailers18 . In the extreme case where the value of the outside
option is not even attractive (i.e. Ω ≤ g(i) where i = 1, ..., n), the platform prefers to be a pure
"merchant" at each level of brand variety (i.e. the "contract curve" becomes a vertical line at
ns = 0).
17The reason is that the price of the directly retailed brands increases less than that of the merchandised
brands.
18The platform has already extracted all the surpluses from the producers of the merchandised brands by
setting the wholesale price at the marginal cost.
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Figure 2.9: Illustration of the "contract curve" when the outside option becomes less attractive
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has derived two key insights concerning the optimal composite of the two brand
types for a two-sided platform that connects consumers and brands sold by both direct retailers
and those merchandised by the platform.
Firstly, we examine the existence of the optimal brand portfolio for every level of brand
variety. We find that the intermediary would prefer to be a pure "two-sided platform" when
the platform’s hosting capacity is below a certain level; and both brand types coexist on the
platform when its hosting capacity is above a certain level. We have mainly discussed the hybrid
mode and the trade-offs between the "intermediary-as-a-middleman" and the "intermediary-as-
a-two-sided-platform" business models from the perspective of the platform owner. Our analysis
shows that the merchandised brands are always priced higher than the directly retailed ones,
and the platform extracts all the surpluses from the producers of the merchandised brands in
the hybrid mode. We also find that whenever the platform includes an existing directly retailed
brand into its self-brand portfolio, the equilibrium prices of both types of brands are increased.
Secondly, the comparative statics with respect to the platform’s hosting capacity capture
some intuition about the dynamics of the optimal brand portfolio. We find a backward bending
proportion plus a vertical proportion of the "contract curve", which means that when the
intermediary increases its capacity, the self-brand portfolio expands while the third-party-brand
portfolio shrinks until it reaches a certain level. This result is supported by empirical evidence
such as the history of business expansion for Amazon.com. Additionally we show that with
indirect network effect in consumer demand and positive expected surplus for the consumers,
the platform is able to extract more surplus from the direct retailers. Consequently, the platform
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is better offwhile the direct retailers are worse off. Also, we find that the reduction in the value
of the outside option will allow the platform to extract more surplus from the direct retailers,
and the pure "merchant" mode is preferred only when the outside option is not at all attractive.
There are a few possible extensions of our analysis that are of interest for future research.
One would be a more general form of the competition among market participants (especially
not restricted by the discreet feature of the Multinomial Logit demand structure). Another
would be the consideration of the heterogeneity even within the same type of brands, which
would bring the issue of asymmetric pricing (within the same brand type), e.g. the location
problem of the Salop’s circular model other than the spaceless MNL model in this chapter.
2.5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1. We need to go back to the platform’s profit function (2.5) which can
be expanded by using (2.3). That is
Π = D(p)ns(qsps − qopw − qsc+ qoc)− nsg(ns) +
ns+no∑
j=ns+1
[D(p)qo(po − pw)− g(j)] (2.29)
Recall that all the elements of the market profile in the above expression (i.e. D(p), qs, qo,
ps, po but NOT pw) can be stated in terms of ns and no. Thus, the profit function has been
manipulated in such a way that the problem is restated as a three-dimensional optimisation
with respect to (ns, no, pw) instead of (r, n, pw). The total derivative of platform’s profits Π






























We also know that in the three-dimensional optimisation, the partial derivatives ofΠ(ns, no, pw)
with respect to ns and no are both zero19 (i.e. ∂Π∂ns = 0 and
∂Π






qoj ) < 0
The negative sign of the above derivative implies that the platform’s profits, Π, decrease in
pw. Thus, it implies that the profit maximisation for the platform necessarily requires to have
pw at its lower bound, which is at the marginal cost c.
Proof of Corollary 2.3. Recall from the equivalence of the platform’s profit function (2.11)
19The partial derivatives are zero when there is an interior solution.
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and (2.23), we have
Ψ(ns, no) = D(ns, no)(nsqsps + noqopo − c)
= D(ns, no)[po(ns, no)− µ− c] (2.30)
Since D(ns, no) and po(ns, no) are both endogenous in ns, these two variables are simul-
taneously affected by the change in ns, i.e. from Ens+no to E′ns+no+1. To scrutinise how the
equilibrium value of expression (2.30) is affected, we first look at the simplified asymmetric
pricing mechanism by fixing the existing prices of the (ns + no) brands. In another word, the
only choice variable is the price of the (no + 1)th platform merchandised brand. Here we put a
subscript f to denote the variables in this case. Then we have
Ψf (n
s, no + 1) = Df (n





f − c) + qof,no+1pof,no+1]











s, no + 1) = Df (n
s, no)
Thus, we can conclude that Ψf (ns, no + 1) = Ψ(ns, no) when pof,no+1 approaches infinity,
which means that Ψf (ns, no+1) at E′ns+no+1 can be as high as Ψ(n
s, no) at Ens+no by making
the (no + 1)th brand priceless. This result is intuitive in that the existing market profile will
not be altered if the additional (no + 1)th brand charges a ridiculously high price.
It implies that by imposing an asymmetric pricing strategy for the platform, the value Ψ





j = 1, ..., no, whereas in equilibrium all the prices should be symmetric. Therefore, we can
conclude that Ψ is strictly preferred at E′ns+no+1 to Ens+no .
Here we have completed the proof of Corollary 2.3.
Proof of Corollary 2.2 and Corollary 2.4. Firstly, we prove the second statement in
Corollary 2.2 that Ψ is concave. Since it is diffi cult to directly show a negative second derivative
to justify concavity of the Ψ function, we try to approach the answer by looking at the sign of
dΨ(ns,n̄−ns)
dns |ns→n̄.
We obtain a more extensive form of the Ψ function by expanding the expression of D(ns, n̄−
ns). That is
Ψ(ns, n̄− ns) = [1− e−(n̄−n
s)e(v−p
o)/µ−nse(v−p
s)/µ)](po − µ− c).









































where M = (n̄− ns)e(v−p
o)/µ + nse(v−p
s)/µ
When ns → n̄, (2.18) yields that ps → µ1−1/n̄+c; and (2.21) yields that p
o → ( µ1−1/n̄+c+µ).
















Then, the first derivative of Ψ (2.31) when ns → n̄ becomes
dΨ(ns, n̄− ns)
dns



















dns in the above expression, we can obtain a function of n̄






































(n̄− 1)2 ) (2.33)
Recall that n̄ ∈ [2,∞), otherwise, the reaction functions will be undefined for the market
competitors. We can show that φ(n̄) = dΨ(n
s,n̄−ns)
dns |ns→n̄ > 0 and is finite when n̄ = 2; and
dφ(n̄)
dn̄ < 0 when n̄ ≥ 2.(See the illustration in Figure 2.10, and the detailed proof is to be
provided). Now we can conclude that the Ψ function is concave.




dn̄ < 0 as derived in the previous
paragraphs, now it is straightforward to yield Corollary 2.4.
Finally, we need to go back to prove the first statement in Corollary 2.2 to show the slope
of Ψ function at ns = 1 is always positive.
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Figure 2.10: Illustration of φ(n̄) function


















where M = (n̄− 1)e(v−p
o)/µ + e(v−p
s)/µ
We learn from Corollary 2.4 that at any ns ∈ [1, n̄] the slope of the Ψ function becomes
smaller as n̄ increases. Thus, we can prove the second statement in Corollary 2.2 by showing a
positive slope of the Ψ function at ns = 1 when n̄→∞. The proof proceeds in this way.
po > ps yields that (e−p
o/µ − e−ps/µ) < 0, thus the first term in (2.34) is positive.
We also learn from Lemma 2.2 (i) that dp
s




dns in the last term in (2.34) is negative (Lemma 2.2 (i)), the proof is complete if we
can show the following inequality as n̄→∞.




⇔ eM < 1 + (po − µ− c)M − e
(v−ps)/µ
µ
where M = (n̄− 1)e(v−p
o)/µ + e(v−p
s)/µ
It can be implied from (2.27) and (2.28) that po →∞ and M →∞ when n̄→∞. Thus the
above inequality is true. Here we have completed all the proofs of Corollary 2.2 and Corollary
2.4.
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where M = (n̄− ns)e(v(n̄)−p
o)/µ + nse(v(n̄)−p
s)/µ
Firstly, we note that the implicit reaction functions such as (2.27) and (2.28) are irrelevant
to v(n̄), thus all the elements in (2.35) with regard to po and ps are unchanged if indirect
network effect is brought in. Secondly, we need to note that v(n̄) affects both M and ev(n̄)/µ
in the above expression. Recall that (e−p




dns are all negative, thus a
suffi cient condition to yield ∂
2
∂ns∂v(n̄)Ψ(n












< 0⇔M > 1
Thus, when there is indirect network effect in consume demand and M > 1, the slope
of the "gross profits" curve Ψ becomes smaller and the optimal portfolio tends to have more
platform merchandised brands (i.e. decrease in ns) at every level of brand variety. Here we






Motivated by the Chinese experience, this chapter develops a two-sided matching model
of marriage markets with search frictions. In particular, we extend the one-market model
of the previous literature to a two-market one, allowing the agents to migrate between
the markets at a fixed cost. The analysis focuses on the unmatched and the migrating
population which is induced by the different initial sex ratios in different marriage markets.
We characterise the equilibrium set in the parameter space of migrating costs. Our results
suggest that the large scale of male migration from rural to urban areas can be explained
by its relatively lower migrating costs and the higher sex-ratio-at-birth (boys to girls) in
rural areas. We also explore the welfare implications and find that a full subsidy of the
migrating costs does not necessarily benefit those who receive them but always benefits
the opposite sex if they are the short sides of both markets.
3.1 Introduction
We model two-sided matching markets with unbalanced inflows and homogeneous agents. One
idea about matching with unbalanced entry is that the vertical heterogeneity in quality results
in an assortative matching format in equilibrium (Chade, 2001). It means that all the active
agents in the market end up with positive utility, leaving the rest of the market empty-handed1 .
In this chapter we set up an alternative market (which means we have two linked markets in
the model) where agents can try to obtain higher (expected) utility. This is typically the case
for the marriage market, job market or even trade in real life, where a proportion of the agents
1This proportion of agents will simply choose not to enter the market in the first place if we assume the
utility of remaining unmatched is zero.
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will choose to look for potential partners in an alternative market in which they are more likely
to get a higher utility, instead of remaining unmatched in their own market. While it is not
straightforward to see how the agents with high quality move in equilibrium, it is relatively
easy to comprehend the bottom agents’motivation for looking for partners in an alternative
market, rather than otherwise being left out in his/her birthplace market. However, the issue is
complicated with heterogeneity in the two-market model since different patterns of externalities
would be brought about by the inter-flows, and at the same time, it would alter the distribution
of the stocks. Therefore, we will only discuss the case with homogeneous agents in this chapter.
The setup of the unbalanced inflows is motivated by the fact that, in many East or South
Asian countries, the sex ratios at birth (i.e. boys to girls) are, more often than not, greater
than unity. Oster (2005) quotes that the population sex ratio is 1.07 in China, 1.08 in India,
and 1.11 in Pakistan. Due to the relatively higher mortality of the new-born boys, as well as
the lower average life expectancy of men, the sex ratios at birth in these countries turn out to
be even higher. Moreover, since the technology of type-B ultrasound (which helps to identify
the sex of the fetuses) became available in the mid-1980s, the unbalanced sex ratios at birth
become more severe due to induced abortion. For China, the culture of son preference, as well
as the differentiated family planning policies for different regions and ethnic groups to control
the population2 mean that there are several characteristics in the distribution of the unbalanced
sex ratios at birth. For example, according to the Fifth National Population Census of China
(2002), the sex-ratio-at-birth in rural areas of China is 1.21, whilst in urban areas this is 1.14.3
With the unbalanced numbers of entrants into the marriage markets in our model, we allow
the singles to seek partners not only in his/her birthplace market but also in the other market
at some additional migrating cost. We are interested in the analysis of the migration between
markets, as well as the unmatched populations in each market in equilibrium. We investigate
the following questions: Who moves in equilibrium? What is the correlation between the
migrating population in equilibrium and the migrating costs? Will welfare be enhanced if the
government subsidises the migrating population to offset the moving costs? If yes, who benefits
from the policy of subsidies? As a matter of fact, data shows that since the mid-1980’s China
has witnessed the largest rural to urban labour flow in the world’s history, of which the majority
are male. Notably, a commonly cited figure puts the number of rural migrants residing in urban
areas at 50 million in the mid-1990’s.
The rural-to-urban migration can be attributed to the urbanisation drive as well as the
relaxation of long-standing policies against rural-to-urban migration, or more specifically, the
incentive of "getting a better job" (Lall, et al, 2006) as discussed in other literature. However,
2For instance, the "One Child Policy" applies only to the majority Han Chinese in urban areas but not those
in rural areas, nor the minority ethnic groups.
3Oster (2005) established and later retracted her hypothesis that women with hepatitis B are more likely to
give birth to male children than female ones.
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there are other incentives that can explain the migration, for example the motivation to search
for a better mate by maximising his/her expected lifetime utility from marriage.
The arguments are developed in the context of the two-sided matching model of a marriage
market, whose settings typically feature heterogeneous agents and costly search, e.g. the dis-
counting in Burdett and Coles (1997), and the fixed search cost in Chade (2001) and Atakan
(2006). The random searching in the heterogeneous case reflects the fact that one individual
cannot tell the quality of others before they meet. However, since in the model we focus mainly
on migration between markets in the model, we assume all the agents are homogeneous in order
to minimise complications. This also implies that the matching set of any single (the set of
agents with whom that single is willing to match) is simply the whole population of the opposite
side market. In other words, any two agents from different sides of the market are mutually
acceptable, and they would be immediately matched upon meeting. Thus there are no search
issues, and one simply meets the other agents randomly.
There is numerous related literature on the one-market matching model of marriage. The
most frequently referred literature, Becker’s papers (1973,1974), show that in a matching mar-
ket with transferable utility (which means the successfully matched agents can fully divide their
joint output) and supermodularity (which means that there is complementarity in joint pro-
duction), every competitive equilibrium exhibits positive assortative matching (PAM). That is
to say that the best man marries the best woman, the second-best man marries the second-best
woman, and so on. Furthermore, PAM also automatically ensures the maximisation of output;
and therefore welfare if we calibrate welfare in terms of output.
However in Becker’s model there is no friction involved in searching for a desirable matching
mate. Subsequent researchers introduce search friction - such as time cost and fixed search
cost - and also take the rate of random meeting into consideration. Based on these settings,
Sattinger (1995), Lu and McAfee (1996) and Chade (2001) consider transferable utility (where
the matched agents split the output by Nash Bargaining) with ex ante heterogeneity, as well
as endogenising the unmatched distribution. Shimer and Smith (2000) prove that within the
framework of a discounted search model, complementarities in joint production are not suffi cient
for positive assortative matching. The intuition here is that the agents need to pay for the
search friction, which lowers the probability of being matched with a desirable partner without
friction. Consequently, the high quality agent might end up settling with a low quality agent,
and thus the assortative matching breaks down. Atakan’s model (2006) includes transferable
utility and constant additive costs, showing that assortative matching relies on the Constant
Surplus Condition4 , which asserts that every agent enjoys the same expected surplus in the
future match.
4This condition emerges since the expected surplus from future matches is the benefit of additional search
and must, at optimum, equal to the constant cost of search.
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Under the conditions of nontransferable utility, search friction and heterogeneity, Burdett
and Coles (1997) and Smith (2006) assume that the utility derived from marriage increases in
his/her partner’s quality. They show that the equilibrium is characterised by a class partition
(or "perfect segmentation" called by Smith), which is to say that marriages are formed only
between couples that belong to the same class/segment. Chade (2001) presents a model with
non-transferable utility and constant additive costs.
Burdett and Coles’s model (1997) of a two-sided matching market with quality heterogeneity
(without migration costs) is a direct forbearer of our analysis. Under search friction (i.e. time
cost by discounting) and the non-transferable utility assumption in our model, the results of
their paper are similar to ours in the one market context. We extend the much discussed one-
market searching model to a two-market one at the expense of losing generality of heterogeneity
to homogeneity. In our model, the new entrants are provided an alternative market to search for
partners, but migrating from the birthplace to the other requires a fixed cost. In the process of
matching, the agents search over an infinite horizon for a partner to maximise their discounted
payoffs, which is different from the undiscounted payoff assumption in Atakan’s model. We
also adopt the non-transferable utility assumption and assume that each agent’s utility derived
from the marriage equals the quality of her/his partner.
In this chapter, we mainly analyse the migrating population and the unmatched population
in equilibrium when the outflows are exactly balanced by the inflows of new entrants. Our
result shows that in the settings of the two-market model with homogeneous agents, discount
rate and fixed migrating costs, there are four types of equilibrium (i.e. either men or men
migrate, both men and women migrate, and neither men or women migrate) in the parameter
space of migrating costs. Moreover, we explore the welfare implication within the framework
of this two-market model. The issue of the aggregate welfare turns out to be too complicated
to solve analytically due to the different patterns of externalities brought about by migration.
However, we find that the aggregate welfare of a single side as a function of its gender inflow
ratio is closely related to the concavity of the expected utility of joining a market. Our result
also shows that the full subsidies of migrating costs do not necessarily benefit those who receive
them, but do always benefit the opposite sex who are the short sides of the markets.
This chapter proceeds in following way: Section 3.2 outlines the general model. Section
3.3 discusses the general description of equilibria in the parameter space of the migrating costs
and also includes some numerical examples. Section 3.4 provides a discussion of the welfare
implications. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
Market Setup: It is a continuous time two-sided matching model with search friction, and there
are a large number of unmatched men and women searching potential mates in the marriage
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markets. The reason for such friction lies in the fact that meeting/dating with other agents is
time-consuming and meeting Mr/Miss Right is haphazard. Each agent randomly meets the rest
of the market, which intuitively makes the unmatched population much larger than the case
without random meeting. The reason why there are unmatched individuals is either that they
simply have not met yet or they have met but are not mutually acceptable. The former case is
determined by meeting technology, and the latter by matching set. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that all agents have unit qualities.
We assume that there are two geographically isolated marriage markets, e.g. the urban and
rural marriage markets, which are denoted by u and r for short. At any given moment, there
is exogenous initial inflow created in each marriage market5 . The population of the exogenous
instantaneous inflow of sex j in market p is denoted by Ipj , where p = u, r and j = m,w.
Accordingly, the unmatched population of sex j in the marriage market p is denoted by Spj ;
the migrating population from urban to rural areas by ∆Iurj , and from rural to urban areas by
∆Iruj .
Utility Function: We assume that marriage gives utility 1, and being single has utility 0.
Strategies: In Burdett and Coles (1997), agents immediately observe each other’s quality
upon meeting. If both propose to each other, they form a marriage and leave the market; if
at least one vetoes, they ignore each other and continue to look for other partners. In our
model of homogeneous agents, all the agents from different sides of the market are mutually
acceptable and they will form a marriage upon meeting. For the individuals who comprise the
initial inflows, they always have a one-shot choice of either entering their birthplace market or
the alternative market at a fixed cost of migrating. Here, the migrating cost for men (women)
from rural to urban area is denoted by Crum (C
ru





Each agent maximises his/her expected present value of payoffs, discounted at the rate ρ. In
the procedure of deciding which market to enter, the newly matured agent evaluates his/her
expected present value in both marketplaces. Once the choice has been made, they form the
ultimate inflows which are indicated by putting primes to the initial inflows, i.e. I ′pj . Together
with those already in the market, the agents will be restricted to seeking desirable partners
in this chosen marketplace. We also assume that the successful matches leave the market and
never split nor return to the marriage market again. Moreover, in the setup of continuous
time model, we assume that some agents leave the market due to physical reasons, e.g. death
or being too old to get married, and we denote the instantaneous probability of non-marital
leaving by δ.
Meeting Technology: Each agent randomly meets the rest of the market in pairs. Here, we
use constant-return-to-scale meeting technology. Time is continuous, and at each moment an
5The initial inflows can be interpreted as the newly matured agents entering the marriage markets; and they
might be further set as endogenous in more general cases.
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j ). In order
to equate the measure of men who meet women and that of women who meet men, we assign












where j = m,w, and α0 ∈ (0, 1) is the meeting effi ciency parameter.
Equilibrium: In stationary equilibrium, the inflow must exactly replicate the outflow in
quantity (and quality) on each side of each market. As described earlier, the outflows are
comprised of two parts: the agents who are successfully matched at each moment and then












−j), plus the agents
who are forced out of the market by physical reasons with instantaneous probability δ > 0.



















We start by characterising the stationary equilibrium and will investigate the condition for its
existence later.
Let W pw denote the expected present value of an unmatched woman who is still searching a
potential mate in market p. While unmatched, she earns nothing, but she meets single men at




w) if she seeks partners in marriage market p. Here,
we assume that unattached agents perfectly estimate the meeting probability with the opposite
sex by observing the unmatched sex ratio in the market. As a result, each agent employs a










































Before we turn to the two-market model, let us first introduce a proposition concerning a
single homogeneous market.
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Proposition 3.1 Given meeting effi ciency α0, positive market leaving rate δ,6 inflows Im and
Iw in a single homogeneous market, there always exists a unique stationary equilibrium (SE).
That is
Sw =
2δIw − (Im − Iw)(α0 − α0δ + δ) +
√
D
2δ(α0 − α0δ + 2δ)
Sm =
2δIm − (Iw − Im)(α0 − α0δ + δ) +
√
D
2δ(α0 − α0δ + 2δ)
,
where D = (Im − Iw)2(α0 − α0δ + δ)2 + 4ImIwδ2.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3.1 shows that the unmatched population of each sex in each market (Sj) is
uniquely determined by the inflows (Ij). In the following paragraphs, we extend the one-market
model in Proposition 3.1 to fit into a two-market model with homogeneous agents, given meeting







of generality, we assume throughout the discussion that the male-to-female sex ratio is higher






w; the relevant migrating
costs Cruw = C
ur
m = ∞, Curw and Crum are positive. Next, we introduce Proposition 3.2 which
shows some basic features concerning the migrating population between the two homogeneous
markets.
Proposition 3.2 (i) For the same side of the two markets, the migration is unilateral rather
than bilateral;
(ii) if both sides of the markets move, the migrating directions are opposite.
Proof. The proof of (i) is straightforward. The marginal benefit of entering an alternative
market only derives from a higher rate of meeting the opposite sex which is endogenously
determined by the ultimate inflows into each market. Recall that the preferences of all agents
are identical, therefore if it is beneficial for an agent to move from his/her birthplace market to
another, it can never be beneficial for any of his/her competitors in the other market to move
in the opposite direction.
Next, we prove (ii) by contradiction. Without loss of generality, we suppose that there are
both urban-born men and women moving to rural marriage market in SE. Thus, in equilibrium
the marginal benefit for the urban-born agent to move must be equal to the marginal migrating
6 It is shown in the Appendix that positive market leaving rate is a necessary condition for the equilibrium
with unbalanced inflows.
7As we have described in the introduction, it is especially the case in China, e.g. the sex-ratio-at-birth is
1.21 in rural areas and 1.14 in urban areas.
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= Cwur ≥ 0









We note that inequalities (3.3) and (3.4) contradict each other. Therefore, in SE there must
not exist two groups of agents simultaneously migrating in the same direction. Here we have
completed the proofs of Proposition 3.2.
As a matter of fact, the intuition of Proposition 3.2 is simply that whenever one side of the
markets is on the run for higher expected payoffs, the marginal benefit to the agents on the
other side of moving in the same direction must be negative.
In order to analyse the migrating population, or the incentive for men and/or women to
migrate, we need to answer how the sex ratios in the birthplace and alternative market are
related to their expected payoffs. Next, we establish a corollary and a lemma to answer this
question. Here, the ultimate inflows are defined as the inflows when the men and women have
made up their minds of entering the target markets.
Corollary 3.1 Given the meeting effi ciency α0, the market leaving rate δ and the initial inflow





j , are known.
Proof. Based on Proposition 3.2, we suppose there are two opposite inter-flows between the
markets, i.e. ∆Irum and ∆I
ur

















After a bit more manipulation, we obtain
∆Irum =
−ΓrwIum + ΓuwΓrwIuw − ΓuwIrm + ΓuwΓrwIrw
Γrw − Γuw
∆Iurw =
Ium − ΓuwIuw + Irm − ΓrwIrw
Γrw − Γuw
We note from the above two equations that ∆Irum and ∆I
ur




and Γrw, thus, the four ultimate inflows I
′p





the statement in Proposition 3.1 that a unique equilibrium is guaranteed by the ultimate (or
the realised) inflows into the markets, we can now conclude that the unique equilibrium is also
guaranteed by knowing Γuw and Γ
r
w. Therefore, we complete the proof of Corollary 3.1.
Corollary 3.1 indicates that the unmatched population Spj can be estimated either by ob-
serving the sizes of migrating population, i.e. ∆Irum and ∆I
ur
w , or by knowing the sex ratios of
the ultimate inflows, i.e. Γuw and Γ
r
w.
In the following paragraphs, we will discuss the correlation amongW pj (the expected present
value for the sex j agents in market p), Mpj (which is defined as the sex ratio of unmatched










j (the sex ratio of the
ultimate inflows as defined in Corollary 3.1) in stationary equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1 (i) Mpj is a strictly increasing function of Γ
p
j ;
(ii) Mpj ≷ Γ
p
j if and only if Γ
p




j = 1 if and only if Γ
p
j = 1;
(iii) W pj is a strictly increasing function of Γ
p















only scenario that can arise in equilibrium is that men migrate from rural to urban area and/or
women from urban to rural area, if any; i.e. ∆Im = ∆Irum = −∆Iurm , ∆Iw = ∆Iurw = −∆Iruw ,
where ∆Im and ∆Iw are both non-negative. As the outflows replicate the ultimate inflows in




















































w + ∆Iw (3.8)
Dividing (3.6) by (3.5) and (3.8) by (3.7), we obtain





α0(1− δ)Mpj /(1 +M
p





Manipulating the above equation, it yields that
Γpj − 1 =
Mpj δ − δ
α0(1− δ)Mpj /(1 +M
p
j ) + δ
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j ) + δ/(α0 − α0δ)
(3.9)





























2 + δ/(α0 − α0δ)]
[Mpj /(M
p





Now we have shown that Mpj is a strictly increasing function of Γ
p
j .
Next, let us turn to [ii] in the lemma.
We rewrite (3.9) in the following form.
Mpj − 1 = (Γ
p




Since the last term in the square brackets is strictly greater than unity, it is now easy to
arrive at the conclusion in Lemma 3.1 [ii].
Then, we move on to the last statement in the lemma.















−j + 1 + α0θ
=
α0θ
1/Mpj + 1 + α0θ
(3.10)
It can be easily implied from the above equation that W pj strictly increases in M
p
j . As we
have already proved that Mpj increases in Γ
p
j , we can now arrive at a well-defined function such
that W pj = f(Γ
p
j ), which is also strictly increasing in Γ
p




Here we have completed all the proofs in Lemma 3.1
Lemma 3.1 captures the intuition that the expected present value of a male (female) agent
is positively related to the female-to-male sex ratio (the male-to-female sex ratio) of the ulti-
mate inflows in the candidate market. More specifically, the sex ratio of the ultimate inflows
determines that of the unmatched population, through which the expected present values of all
agents are formed; in return, the decisions on entering which market affect the sex ratios of the
ultimate inflows.
The result of Lemma 3.1 [ii] is also intuitive in that the imperfection of the matching tech-
nology necessarily leads to an increased sex ratio gap in the unmatched population, compared
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to that of the inflows.
In order to shed more light on the market profiles in equilibrium, we will establish Corollary












We need to be careful that, unlike Lemma 3.1, C̄rum and C̄
ur
w in the above definitions are
determined by the sex ratio of the initial inflows, which are exogenous.
Corollary 3.2 Crum ≥ C̄rum and Curw ≥ C̄urw are necessary conditions for the equilibrium in
which neither side of the markets moves.
Proof. If neither side of the market moves in equilibrium (that is, there are no inter-flows
between markets), the necessary conditions are
Wum −W rm = f(Γum)− f(Γrm) ≤ Crum (3.13)



















Substituting for Γpj in (3.13) and (3.14) by using (3.15) and (3.16), it follows that
f(Iuw/I
u
m)− f(Irw/Irm) ≤ Crum
f(Irm/I
r
w)− f(Ium/Iuw) ≤ Curw
Recalling the definitions of (3.11) and (3.12), we can conclude that for all Crum ≥ C̄rum and
Curw ≥ C̄urw neither side of markets moves in equilibrium. Additionally, since the ultimate
inflows are the same as the initial inflows in this case, we are able to derive the unmatched
population Spj in equilibrium by using Proposition 3.1.
So far it is only shown that Crum ≥ C̄rum and Curw ≥ C̄urw are necessary for the non-migration
equilibrium, and we will show that they are also suffi cient conditions in the summary immedi-
ately after Corollary 3.4.
Now consider the situation that only men migrate from rural to urban area while women
are indifferent between moving or not. Then, the following conditions must be satisfied in
equilibrium.
Wum −W rm = f(Γum)− f(Γrm) = f(1/Γuw)− f(1/Γrw) = Crum (3.17)
45
W rw −Wuw = f(Γrw)− f(Γuw) = Curw (3.18)
∆Im =




Ium − ΓuwIuw + Irm − ΓrwIrw
Γrw − Γuw
= 0 (3.20)
Intuitively, we are able to derive a function, i.e. Curw = h1(C
ru
m ), from the equation system




Ium − ΓuwIuw + Irm
) = Crum (3.21)
f(
Ium − ΓuwIuw + Irm
Irw
)− f(Γuw) = Curw (3.22)
Since f(·) is a strictly increasing function (Lemma 3.1 [iii]), (3.22) implies that Curw is a
strictly decreasing function of Γuw, while (3.21) implies that Γ
u
w is a strictly decreasing function





from the equation system (3.17), (3.18) and (3.20). Additionally, it is worth noting that Γuw
reaches its lower bound when Crum reaches its upper bound. If we substitute the lower bound




w into (3.21), we derive the same maximum C̄
ru
m as defined in (3.11).
Therefore, we conclude that for all (Crum , C
ur




m ) and C
ru
m <
C̄rum , only men migrate from rural to urban area, while women are indifferent between moving
or not in equilibrium. Now it is straightforward to show that women are discouraged from
migrating (from urban to rural area) if we further relax the condition such that Curw ≥ h1(Crum ).
Next, let us consider the situation where only women migrate from urban to rural area while
men are indifferent between moving or not. In this scenario, (3.17) and (3.18) still hold while
(3.19) and (3.20) should be altered as follows:
∆Im =




Ium − ΓuwIuw + Irm − ΓrwIrw
Γrw − Γuw
> 0
By using the same logic as in the previous arguments, we are able to derive a strictly






w ) from the equation system (3.17), (3.18)
and (3.23). Similarly, it can be concluded that for Crum ≥ h2(Curw ) and Curw < C̄urw only women
migrate from urban to rural area, while men stay.
We can summarise the results so far by establishing Corollary 3.3 as follows.
Corollary 3.3 [i] Curw ≥ h1(Crum ) and Crum = C̄rum are necessary conditions for the equilibrium
where only men migrate from rural to urban area;
[ii] Crum ≥ h2(Curw ) and Curw < C̄urw are necessary conditions for the equilibrium where only
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women migrate from urban to rural area.
To see it more clearly, Cwur = h1(C
m





w ) from (3.17), (3.18) and (3.23). The only difference between these two equation systems
lies in the constraints affected by whether it is ∆Im or ∆Iw that equals zero. Furthermore, it is
relatively simple to show that both Curw = h1(C
ru









However, so far the only information missing is whether Curw = h1(C
ru





m ), or they are intersected with each other. To explain what the boundaries of
parameter space actually look like, we establish the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4 [i] The curve Curw = h1(C
ru

















m are necessary conditions for the equilibrium
where both sides of the markets are on the move.
Proof. See Appendix.
From Corollary 3.2 to Corollary 3.4, we have exhausted all the scenarios that might arise,
thus, all these conditions are both necessary and suffi cient for the corresponding equilib-
rium/equilibria. We can sum up the parameter space and describe the corresponding equi-
librium/equilibria in Figure 3.1.







8 It can be verified simply by substituting the coordinates of origin and (C̄mru, C̄
w
ur) into (3.17) and (3.18).
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Summary 3.1 In region A, i.e. Curw ≥ h−12 (Crum ) and Crum < C̄rum , there is a unique equilibrium
where only men migrate from rural to urban area.
In region B, i.e. Crum ≥ h−11 (Curw ) and Curw < C̄urw , there is a unique equilibrium where only
women migrate from urban to rural area.
In region C, there are multiple equilibria, i.e. men migrate from rural to urban area, and/or
women migrate from urban to rural area.
In region D, i.e. Crum ≥ C̄rum and Curw ≥ C̄urw , there is a unique equilibrium where neither
side of the markets moves.
The result we have derived is supported by some empirical evidence.
As we mentioned before, many of the Asian countries (i.e. China, Korea, Vietnam, etc.)
have the rooted traditions of son preference. Thus, the sex ratios of the newly—born boys to







w. These countries more often than not have relatively isolated rural
and urban economies. Also, the relevant cost of migrating from urban to rural area is much
higher than the other way around.9 Thus, the fact that the majority of the workers migrating
from rural to urban area are male can also be easily derived by using our model here (i.e. region
A in Figure 3.1 in our model).
As the description of the equilibria in the above discussion is a bit abstract, we introduce a
few numerical examples by assigning reasonable values to the parameters.
Example 3.1 Given meeting effi ciency α0 = 0.1, market leaving rate δ = 0.02, discount rate
ρ = 0.02 and the initial inflow Ium = 1.2, I
u
w = 1.0, I
r
m = 1.8, I
r
w = 1.0, calculate the unmatched
population of the marriage market in equilibrium in the parameter space of (Crum , C
w
ur).







Then, we need to identify the pair of threshold migrating costs (C̄rum , C̄
w
ur) with which both
men and women are indifferent between migrating or not. Thus, the ultimate inflows are the











By using Lemma 3.1 (iii) and the expressions (3.11) and (3.12), the pair of threshold mi-
grating costs can be solved as
C̄urw = 0.0586
9Here, the cost does not necessarily mean the physical cost, but rather the psychological barriers towards
a different market, or it can be interpreted as the opportunity costs. For instance, urban areas generally have
more convenient facilities for living in almost all aspects, thus, it is easier for the rural-born male to adapt to
living in urban areas, but not vice versa.
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C̄rum = 0.1762
Thus, neither side of the markets moves in equilibrium when the migrating costs exceed the
threshold levels, i.e. in region D: Crum ≥ C̄rum = 0.1762 and Curw ≥ C̄urw = 0.0586.
The curves, i.e. Curw = h1(C
ru






m ), can be derived by solving the equation
systems, i.e. (3.17)(3.18)(3.20) and (3.17)(3.18)(3.23), respectively, with all the information
provided.
Figure 3.2 illustrates how the unmatched population Spj responds to the change of C
ru
m
within region A (i.e. Curw ≥ h−12 (Crum ) and Crum < C̄rum = 0.1762). In this case, there are only
men migrating from rural to urban area in equilibrium. We note from Figure 3.2 that Sum




w converge when C
ru
m approaches zero, which coincides with our
presumption in the example that Iuw = I
r
w.
Figure 3.2: The unmatched populations Spj in equilibrium when C
w
ur ≥ h−12 (Cmru) and Cmru <
0.1762
Similarly, when the prior migrating costs are in region B (i.e. Crum ≥ h−11 (Curw ) and Curw <
C̄urw = 0.0586), there are only women migrating from urban to rural area in equilibrium. Figure
3.3 illustrates that how the unmatched populations Spj respond to the change of C
ur
w in this









which coincides with our presumption in the example that Ium < I
r
m.
As stated in Corollary 3.4, there are multiple equilibria where men migrate from rural to
urban area and/or women migrate from urban to rural area when the prior migrating costs










m = 0.1762 in this example).
The equilibria where either side of the markets moves have already been covered in the last
two cases; moreover, there is another equilibrium where both sides of the markets are on the
move. For example, given. Crum = 0.08 and C
ur
w = 0.0242, which are both inside region C,
the migrating populations and the unmatched populations Spj in equilibrium can be derived by
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Figure 3.3: The unmatched populations Spj in equilibrium when C
m
ru ≥ h−11 (Cwur) and Cwur <
0.0586
solving the equation system (3.17)(3.18)(3.20)(3.23). That is, ∆Irum = 0.0531, ∆I
ur
w = 0.0739,
and Sum = 26.5500, S
u
w = 10.1992, S
r
m = 44.5225, S
r
w= 10.8733.
Additionally, recalling that we have Ium/I
u




w in the example, we can
see from both Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 that Srm and S
u





are increasing in equilibrium as Crum decreases. More specifically, the reduction in C
ru
m directly
increases Sum and decreases S
r
m, and then decreases S
u
w and increases S
r
w through positive
externalities. This result also can be applied when Curw decreases.
In the next example, we would like to see how the unmatched populations Spj respond to
the change of one initial inflow in equilibrium holding other parameters constant.
Example 3.2 Given meeting effi ciency α0 = 0.1, market leaving rate δ = 0.02, discount rate
ρ = 0.02, the cost for men migrating from rural area to urban area Crum = 0.1055, the cost for
women of migrating from urban to rural area Curw = 0.0410, and the initial inflows I
u
m = 1.2,
Iuw = 1.0, I
r
w = 1.0; we let I
r
m vary from 1.2 to 2.4 in order to see how the unmatched populations
Spj change in equilibrium.
The equilibrium unmatched populations of the marriage markets are displayed in Figure 3.4.














m) all have kinks at their
intersects with the dash line. On the left of the dash line, the market reaches an equilibrium
that neither side of the markets moves; and on the right of the dash line, the market reaches
an equilibrium where only men migrate from rural to urban area.
3.3.1 The Equilibrium Set with a Common Migrating Cost
In this subsection, we describe the equilibrium set in a two dimensional diagram where the
horizontal axis represents the common migrating cost, i.e. Crum = C
ur
w = C, and the vertical
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Figure 3.4: The equilibrium unmatched populations Spj when I
r
m varies from 1.2 to 2.4








= r < 1.
By using Lemma 3.1 (iii), when men are indifferent between the two marriage markets the
following condition must be satisfied:
f(Iuw/I
u









) = C (Curve for men) (3.24)









)− f(Ium/Iuw) = C (Curve for women) (3.25)
Since f(·) is an increasing function, the curves for men and women are downward sloping.
The intuition here is that, as the gap between the urban and rural sex ratio of the initial
inflows widens, it increases the incentive for men/women to migrate; thus, it requires higher
migration cost to make them indifferent between the two markets. It is worth noting that the
equation system (3.24) and (3.25) always has trivial solution such that C = 0 and r = 1. It is
intuitive that, as the same ratio yields the same level of expected payoff for any new entrant,
the migration cost becomes irrelevant.
Assume the sex ratio Ium/I
u




, then when r approaches zero we have:
f(Iuw/I
u












which are the horizontal intercepts for the two curves.
If the equation system only has the trivial solution, the two curves can be plotted in Figure
3.5 (It means that the two curves do not intersect for C > 0):
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It is relatively easy to understand that, for parameters in region D in Figure 3.5 (when the
cost of migration is high for both sexes), neither men or women migrate in equilibrium (which
corresponds to region D in Figure 3.1). Especially, when the sex ratios in both markets are the
same, i.e. r = 1 (the horizontal dashed line), people surely have no incentive to move.
For parameters in region A in Figure 3.5 (a) (when the cost of migration is too high for
women but not for men), only men migrate in equilibrium (which corresponds to region A in
Figure 3.1). Similarly, for parameters in region B in Figure 3.5 (b) (when the cost of migration
is too high for men but not for women), only women migrate in equilibrium (which corresponds
to region B in Figure 3.1).
For parameters in region C in Figure 3.5 (when the cost of migration is affordable for both
sexes), there are multiple equilibria, i.e. men migrate from rural to urban area, and/or women
migrate from urban to rural area (which corresponds to region C in Figure 3.1).
Next, we look at the case when the equation system (3.24) and (3.25) has nontrivial solution,
the two curves can be plotted in Figure 3.6 (It means that the two curves intersect with each
other for C > 0):
Generally speaking, the description of the equilibrium/equilibria for the parameters in region
C and region D in Figure 3.6 are the same as in the previous case. In the region where the curve
for women is on the right (left) of the curve for men, there are only men (women) migrating in
equilibrium. And this results also hold for the case of having multiple intersections for the two
curves.
At first glance, the descriptions of the equilibrium set in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 here
are very close to that in Figure 3.1 in the previous subsection, since all the diagrams divide
the parameter space into three or four parts, each of which corresponds to a certain type of
equilibrium/equilibria, i.e. in region A (B) only men (women) migrate, and in region D no one
migrates, and in region C men migrate from rural to urban area and/or women migrate from
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urban to rural area in equilibrium. The benefit is obvious. Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 allow us
to link the contribution of the migration cost and the ratio of the urban and rural sex ratio of
the initial inflows; and it helps us to gain more intuitions about how the type of equilibrium is
jointly decided by the two factors.
It is relatively easy to comprehend that, when the migration cost is high enough, both
sexes prefer to stay no matter how different the sex ratios in the two markets are. It is also
not diffi cult to understand that, as the migration cost decreases and becomes affordable to
one sex but not to the other, those who can afford cost would migrate to the other market
in equilibrium. It follows that, as the migration cost becomes affordable to both sexes, both
men and women might migrate to a different marriage market in equilibrium. However, it is
worth noting that, as migration of men (women) from rural (urban) to urban (rural) area would
bring positive externalities to the women (men) in urban (rural) area, the one-way migration
equilibrium (either men or women migrate in equilibrium) might also rise in addition to the
two-way migration equilibrium. As a matter of fact, it is a coordination problem of migration
between rural men and urban women then.
3.4 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we conduct a welfare analysis to check whether welfare can be increased by
subsidising towards migrating costs. Recall that we have assumed that each individual’s utility
derived from marriage equals the quality of her/his partner, which is normalised as unity. In
this sense, we can sum up the expected present values of all entering agents to measure welfare.






w. Suppose the relevant migrating costs are in region
A, we learn from Summary 3.1 that in equilibrium there are only men migrating from rural to
urban area, i.e. ∆Irum > 0 and ∆I
ur
w = 0. On the one hand, if the government only partially
subsidises women to reduce their cost of migrating to rural area within region A (i.e. Curw moves
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m )), the equilibrium remains the same and the policy is
ineffective in improving the welfare. On the other hand, if the government subsidises men in
order to reduce their cost of migrating to urban area within region A (i.e. Crum moves leftward),
the sex ratios of both urban and rural marriage market will converge. Thus, we mainly discuss
how the welfare responds to the subsidies for only male migrants in this section.
Recalling that W pj denotes the expected present value of an unmatched agent of sex j still
searching in marriage market p, it is straightforward to write the welfare function as follows.
Π = (WumI
′u
m − Crum ∆Irum ) +WuwI ′uw +W rmI ′rm +W rwI ′rw
We note in equilibrium that the migrating population (i.e. the rural-born men) must be
indifferent between moving or staying; that is, Wum −W rm = Crum . Thus, we are able to derive
an important welfare function, which we can see in a more general form by using the initial
inflows Ipj and the sex ratios of the ultimate inflows Γ
p





































w without loss of generality, we normalise the initial inflow of
urban women as unity, whilst the other initial inflows can be written as
Ium = k1, I
u
w = 1, I
r
m = k2λ, I
r







w implies that k2 > k1)




















m −∆Irum )/Irw = k2 −∆Irum /λ (3.29)
Substituting (3.27) and (3.28) and (3.29) into the welfare function (3.26), we arrive at
another form of the welfare function, expressed in terms of ∆Irum . That is
Π = f(1/(k1 + ∆I
ru
m ))k1 + f(k1 + ∆I
ru












































< 0 as the migrant population decreases in the migrating cost.
The main argument here is that the reduced migrating cost encourages more people (i.e.
sex j agents) to move, which has positive (negative) externalities to the rest of the sex j agents
in the birthplace (target) market and the sex −j agents in the target (birthplace) market. But
the aggregate effect of the externalities seems ambiguous so far. Instead, we decompose it into:






m; and [ii] the female-side market







In order to simplify the analysis of comparative statics, we restrict ourselves to the case that
the government fully subsidises the male migrants, which we denote by a subscript fs. In this







Lemma 3.2 When Γpw is in the area where f(·) is concave (convex), the full subsidies for the
male migrants increase (decrease) the female-side market welfare.
































) = f(Γuw,fs) = f(Γ
r
w,fs)
the last line is derived by using (3.30)
Multiplying both sides of the above inequality by (1 + λ), we obtain
f(Γuw) + λf(Γ
r








w ≶ f(Γuw,fs)Iuw + f(Γrw,fs)Irw
Here we complete the proof of Lemma 3.2.
In Lemma 3.1 we show that f(·) is an increasing function without giving its explicit form.
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We learn from Lemma 3.2 that the welfare is closely related to the concavity (convexity) of
f(·). Figure 3.7 gives a general description of the shape of f(·) curve, which is convex (concave)
when Γ ≶ Γ∗. It can be shown that Γ∗ is always less than unity10 .
Figure 3.7: The shape of f(x) curve
As we mentioned, whilst the migration of sex j brings positive (negative) externalities to the
opposite sex −j in the target (birthplace) market, it is unclear whether the aggregate welfare
of sex −j is affected. We establish the following corollary to provide the necessary condition
under which the full subsidies toward one group would benefit the other group as a whole.
Corollary 3.5 The full subsidies towards sex j migrants always increase the welfare of the












w > 1, which necessarily yields Γ
u
w > 1 and Γ
r
w > 1 in
equilibrium. Thus, Γuw and Γ
r
w are both located on the concave part of f(·) curve (Figure
3.7). Then, Lemma 3.2 implies that a full subsidy towards male migrants always increases the
female-side welfare.
Here we complete the proof of Corollary 3.5.
Next, we introduce a numerical example to illustrate Lemma 3.2 and Corollary 3.5.
Example 3.3 Given the meeting effi ciency α0 = 0.1, the market leaving rate δ = 0.02, the
discount rate ρ = 0.02, the initial inflow Ium = 1.5, I
u
w = 1.0, I
r
m = 1.9, I
r
w = 1.0 and the
10This statement is supported by running a number of tests, but we have not provided the details of the proof
of this statement in this chapter.
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migrating costs Crum = 0.08, C
ur
w = 0.04, compare the welfare before and after the men are fully
subsidised for the migrating cost.
Following the same calculation as in Example 1, the pair of threshold migrating costs can
be derived as follows:
Crum = 0.0888
Curw = 0.0213
We note that the prior costs Crum = 0.08 and C
ur
w = 0.04 are in region A in Figure 3.1, which
implies that there is a unique equilibrium where only men migrate from rural to urban area.
If the government fully subsidises the male migrants, the relevant sizes of the migrating
population and the ultimate inflows, as well as the male-side (female-side) welfare, can be














without subsidy 0.08 0.04 0.0192 1.5192 1 1.8808 1 1.0484 1.3306
full subsidy to men 0.00 0.04 0.2000 1.7000 1 1.7000 1 1.0469 1.3344
Table 3.1: The comparison of the male-(female-)side welfare with/without subsidy
Substituting α0 = 0.1, δ = 0.02 and ρ = 0.02 into (3.9) and (3.10), we derive the inflexion
Γ∗ = 0.6887 in this specific example, i.e. f(·) is convex (concave) when Γ ≶ 0.6887.
We note from last column in Table 3.1 that, conditional on Γpw being on the concave pro-
portion of f(·) curve (i.e. Γrw = 1.8808 > 0.6887 and Γuw = 1.5192 > 0.6887), the female-side
welfare is increased as the government subsidises men who are migrating to urban area. In
contrast, we note from the second last column in the table that, conditional on Γpm is on the
convex proportion of f(·) curve (i.e. Γrm = 1/1.8808 < 0.6887 and Γum = 1/1.5192 < 0.6887),
the male-side welfare decreases even if it is men that receive a full subsidy.
All the results in the numerical example coincide with the statements in Lemma 3.2 and
Corollary 3.5.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter develops a two-sided matching model of marriage markets with homogeneous
agents and non-transferable utility. We extend the framework of the one-market model by
Burdett and Coles (1997) into a two-market one, and also incorporate the migrating cost which
might alter the decisions of new entrants. While it is easy to understand that migration between
markets can be the result of the different sex ratios, which are determined by the unbalanced
inflows and meeting effi ciency, it is important to note that the type of equilibrium (equilibria)
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also depend(s) on the relevant migrating costs. We have shown in the chapter that, with any
fixed inflows of unbalanced sex ratios the markets always come to an equilibrium (equilibria),
and the migrating directions can not be same for both groups of agents, if any (Proposition
3.2). That is, if migration turns out to be too costly for both sides of the markets, the markets
reach an equilibrium where neither side of the market moves; if the migration costs are too high
for one side but affordable for the other, only the latter migrate in equilibrium. However, if the
migrating costs are equally affordable to both sides of the markets, there are multiple equilibria
where either or both sides are on the move. The main idea here is that the migration of any
agent brings positive (negative) externalities to the agents of same sex (the opposite sex) in the
birthplace market and the opposite sex (the agents of same sex) in the target market. Besides,
based on the assumptions of the much higher urban-to-rural-area migrating cost than vice versa,
plus the higher sex-ratio-at-birth (boys-to-girls) in rural area, our model helps to explain the
important force driving a large population of male migrants (rather than female migrants) into
the urban cities from rural areas. Furthermore, we have characterised the equilibrium set in
the two dimensional diagram where the horizontal axis represents the common migrating cost
and the vertical axis represents the ratio of the urban and rural sex ratio.
We have explored the welfare implication within the framework of this model. The welfare
is calibrated in terms of the expected payoffs of all entering agents. Thus it is a function of
the sizes of each inflow and the sex ratios in each market. Instead of looking at the aggregate
welfare of the inflows, we examine how the welfare of a single market-side responds to the
subsidy of the migrating costs for the other side. Our analysis has shown that the full subsidy
of the migrating costs does not necessarily benefit those who receive them but always benefits
the opposite sex if they are the short sides of both markets.
We have not analysed such interesting issues as which exact equilibrium we’d be in if the
migrating costs varied for different paths, since the multiple equilibria conclusion is not always
a satisfying answer to real life problems. However, we might ignore this issue since the set of
"equally affordable" migrating costs is relatively small, and in practice it is not likely for the
cost parameter to fall in this narrow a set.
In the simple settings of our model, we have not considered the market of heterogeneous
agents, which might better fit into the conditions that truly affect individuals’decisions when
seeking a long-term partner. It is without a doubt a more complicated topic since it would
inevitably involve the quality distribution of the unmatched population.
3.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. In SE, the inflows exactly replicate the outflows. Here, we only
need to equate the volume of flows since the homogeneous market condition ensures a constant
degenerated quality distribution. Given the meeting technology, the instantaneous number of
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successful matches on either side of market is α0SmSw/(Sm + Sw), which must be equal to the
inflow, (if adding up the destruction of population due to physical reason). The conditions can






) = (1− δ)α0SmSw
Sw + Sm






) = (1− δ)α0SmSw
Sw + Sm
+ δSm = Im (3.32)
Subtracting equation (3.31) from (3.32), we obtain




Substituting (3.33) into (3.31), we obtain a quadratic equation in terms of Sw. That is
k1S
2
w + k2Sw + k3 = 0 (3.34)
where k1 = 2δ
2 + α0δ − α0δ2
k2 = (α0 − α0δ + δ)(Im − Iw)− 2δIw
k3 = −Iw(Im − Iw)
The following statements show the uniqueness of the pair of positive solutions to equation
(3.33) and (3.34).
Since δ ∈ (0, 1), we have k1 = 2δ2+α0δ−α0δ2 > 0; additionally, the discriminant is positive,
which is
D = k22 − 4k1k3
= (α0Im − α0δIm + δIm + α0δIw − α0Iw − 3δIw)2 + 4Iw(Im − Iw)(2δ2 + α0δ − α0δ2)
= (Im − Iw)2(α0 − α0δ + δ)2 + 4ImIwδ2 > 0
If we assume without loss of generality that Im > Iw, then it immediately yields that
k1 > 0, k3 < 0 and D > 0, which imply only one positive root S∗w to the quadratic equation
(3.34). Thus, we obtain a unique pair of root (S∗w, S
∗
m) by substituting S
∗
w into (3.33).
Alternatively, we can give out the unique pair of positive solutions mathematically. The
roots of equation (3.34) are
S∗w =
2δIw − (Im − Iw)(α0 − α0δ + δ)±
√
D
2δ(α0 − α0δ + 2δ)
The case of Im > Iw has been discussed already and proves to have one unique pair of
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positive roots to the simultaneous equations (3.31) and (3.32). Next, we move on to the case of
Im < Iw, which yields that k2 < 0. By using basic algebra, k1 > 0, k2 < 0, k3 > 0 and D > 0
imply that S∗w1 and S
∗
w2 are both positive. The first pair of roots are
S∗w1 =
2δIw − (Im − Iw)(α0 − α0δ + δ) +
√
D
2δ(α0 − α0δ + 2δ)
> 0
S∗m1 =
2δIw − (Im − Iw)(α0 − α0δ + δ) +
√
D





2δIw − (Iw − Im)(α0 − α0δ + δ) +
√
D
2δ(α0 − α0δ + 2δ)
>
2δIw − (Iw − Im)(α0 − α0δ + δ) + (Iw − Im)(α0 − α0δ + δ)
2δ(α0 − α0δ + 2δ)
> 0
Accordingly, the second pair of roots are
S∗w2 =
2δIw − (Im − Iw)(α0 − α0δ + δ)−
√
D
2δ(α0 − α0δ + 2δ)
> 0
S∗m2 =
2δIw − (Im − Iw)(α0 − α0δ + δ)−
√
D





2δIw − (Iw − Im)(α0 − α0δ + δ)−
√
D
2δ(α0 − α0δ + 2δ)
<
2δIw − (Iw − Im)δ −
√
(Im − Iw)2δ2 + 4ImIwδ2






2δ(α0 − α0δ + 2δ)
= 0
We note that the second pair of roots should be ruled out by a on-negativity constraint.
It is worth noting that when δ = 0 there is no root for the equation system (3.31) and (3.32),
thus δ > 0 is a necessary condition for the equilibrium with unbalanced inflows.
Here, we have completed the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Proof of Corollary 3.4. As for the necessary conditions for the equilibrium that both sides
of the market move, (3.17) and (3.18) shall still hold, but the constraints on ∆Im and ∆Iw are
relaxed as follows:
∆Im =




Ium − ΓuwIuw + Irm − ΓrwIrw
Γrw − Γuw
> 0 (3.36)
Intuitively, since (3.17) and (3.18) consist an indeterminate equation system of Curw and
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Crum , we can not derive C
ur
w exclusively in terms of C
ru
m . Instead, we try to find how C
ur
w ranges
at each level of Crum . In the following paragraphs, we intend to obtain the range of C
ur
w by
allowing Γrw and/or Γ
u
w to vary within their constraints, i.e. (3.35) and (3.36). However, in
order to avoid further confusion, we divide the proof into four parts.
First of all, we derive the correlation between Γrw and ∆Iw as follows:






































w −∆Iw)− Ium = Irm − Γrw(Irw + ∆Iw) (3.37)





(Iuw −∆Iw)− Γuw = −
∂Γrw
∂∆Iw








(Iuw −∆Iw) + (Irw + ∆Iw)] = Γuw − Γrw (3.38)










w in equilibrium. Also, as
∂Γuw
∂Γrw
> 0, Iuw −∆Iw > 0 and Irw + ∆Iw > 0, (3.38) implies that
∂Γrw
∂∆Iw




Secondly, we derive the correlation between Cwur and ∆Iw as follows:









































Recalling from the proof in Lemma 3.1 that W pj =
α0θ
















































(Muw + 1 + α0θ)
2
(Mrw + 1 + α0θ)
2
> 0 (3.42)
Thirdly, we derive the correlation between Curw and Γ
r
w as follows:
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(3.43)










w. Also, as we learn from
the proof in Lemma 3.1 that Mpw increases in Γ
p












Finally, combining the results of (3.44) with (3.39), we arrive at the conclusion that Cwur is an
increasing (decreasing) function of ∆Iw (∆Im). It implies that the lower (upper) bound of Curw
coincides with the lower bound of ∆Iw (∆Im) which equals zero. Recalling that Curw = h1(C
ru
m )
is defined by the equation system (3.17) and (3.18) plus ∆Iw = 0, while Crum = h2(C
ur
w ) is
defined by (3.17) and (3.18) plus ∆Im = 0, we arrive at the following inequality.
h1(C
ru







Now we have completed all the proofs in Corollary 3.4.
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Chapter 4




In this chapter the migration is of workers to jobs. We consider a spatial oligopsony
model in which two co-locating small firms with recruiting capacity constraints and a large
firm without such limit are competing for workers along a "strip" market. We discuss
how the recruiting capacity affects the intra-group competition and hence the inter-group
competition. We show that when the recruiting limits shrink the expected wages offered
by the small firms decrease, while the wage offered by the big firm increases. This in turn
helps to explain the recent trend of wage disparity between public and private jobs. We
also provide a three-stage-game framework (the workers decide whether to relocate in the
first stage, then the big firm decides its wage offer, and lastly, the two co-locating firms
simultaneous set wages), and characterise the equilibrium wages and the size and direction
of migration.
4.1 Introduction
We consider a spatial oligopsony model in which two co-locating small firms with recruiting
capacity constraints and a big firm without such limit are competing for workers along a "strip"
market. The two types of employers in the model can be many private firms that are constrained
by the recruiting limits, and the public sector, which is relative flexible in size. Besides, the
distribution of the workers on the Hotelling line indicates each individual’s job preference, i.e.
some might place a higher value on the public services, which brings them a sense of "warm
glow" (Andreoni, 1990), whilst others may care more about the monetary payment. The wage
differentials between the public and private sectors have been intensively explored in empirical
research. Most literature finds that the workers in public services receive premium pay, which
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can mainly be attributed to the more pervasive unions (Smith, 1976). However, other studies
find a negative differential (i.e. the workers in private sectors receive a pay premium, especially
in developing economies) and attribute it to the effi ciency wage provided by the private firms,
the compensation of higher job security or the non-wage benefit in the public sector. In other
words, the wage premium offered by the private firms are the joint result of inter-sector and
intra-sector competition. In this paper, we show that the employers’recruiting capacities also
constitute an important factor in this wage disparity. Among them, the recruiting limits of
the small firms are more sensitive to the economic environment, for instance, in recession many
employees suffer a salary cut or even unemployment, especially in the private sector. Meanwhile
many workers in the public sector enjoy a pay rise. It is relatively easy to comprehend the former
by the argument of the negative demand shock, however, there is limited economic explanation
for the latter. Worse still in an economic recession, the general public become very frustrated
by such headlines in newspapers that public sector pay races ahead of inflation. We show in
our model that such an unusual trend of wage disparity between the two types of employers
(i.e. the salary cut in the private sector together with the pay rise in the public sector) can
be attributed to the shrinking recruiting capacities, which are themselves caused by a general
anticipation of doom often experienced in economic downturn.
In the conventional study of oligopoly (oligopsony), most of the literature focuses on ana-
lysing the behaviour of oligopolists (oligopsonists) upon some prior determined elasticity of
demand (supply) in a homogeneous market. For instance, in the product market, both Cournot
(Quantity) Competition and Bertrand (Price) Competition explicitly assume a downward slop-
ing market demand curve. Among them, the former requires an auctioneer who clears the
market according to the demand schedule (i.e. setting an equilibrium price in accordance with
the realised outputs by all producers), and the latter is pure price competition. Here, we intend
to probe the mechanism of the labour market, and will take advantage of the latter model
since it fits more realistically with the fact that in a labour market, firms often use wage as a
strategic variable rather than depending on a fictional auctioneer to clear the market by setting
an equilibrium wage.
However, there are three major limits of this model. Firstly, in the market where each
consumer can only consume one unit of good (or each worker can only provide one unit of
labour), the price elasticity of demand (or the wage elasticity of labour supply) will be infinite
for the identical producers (employers), which is incompatible with the assumption of the above
models. It makes more sense that, in the real-life circumstance, the price (wage) competition
is imperfect and a price cut (or a wage cut) will not result in the immediate takeover of the
whole market (or the resignation of all employees at once). Thus, we introduce heterogeneous
preferences of workers for the jobs that make the labour supply more inelastic. Secondly, the
conventional literature always skirts around the issue of the strategic behaviour of the firms,
without elaborating on the interaction from the other side of the market. It is true that in the
labour market, either the agents on one side of the market (i.e. workers) might need to overcome
some physical or psychological cost to reach the other side of the market (i.e. employers), or they
would choose to pay a large sum of cost to relocate to a new physical or psychological position
which would enable them to enjoy higher (expected) utility. Thirdly, Bertrand Competition
is often attacked on the grounds that many firms often have producing (or recruiting) limits
that disable them from taking over the whole market. For example, this is typically the case
for many private firms which are constrained by recruiting capacities, whilst the public sector
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is relatively flexible in size. In this case, if one firm does set the wage at the break-even level,
the other firm can always enjoy the residual labour supply, which implies that the firms do not
necessarily set the wage at the break-even level in equilibrium when there is capacity constraint.
A model of wage-setting duopsony is a natural starting point for analysing the behaviour of
oligopsonists. Such a model has been fully solved under the assumption of unlimited recruiting
capacity at a constant marginal revenue product of labour. In this case the unique equilibrium
occurs where each firm sets the break-even wage (if the firms are equal in marginal revenue
product of labour) and yields zero profit (i.e. Bertrand Equilibrium). We can consider the case
of recruiting capacity for an employer as the extreme case of decreasing returns to scale. As we
mentioned before, in the multi-firm case where the employers do not have adequate capacity
to recruit all the workers in the market, they would set wages below the break-even level and
enjoy positive profits (i.e. Bertrand-Edgeworth Model). With the development of studies on
Industrial Organization, there emerges lots of literature on the price-setting game amongst
oligopolists. As a matter of fact, oligopoly and oligopsony are mathematically equivalent, so
the explicit discussion of the price-setting game with capacity constraints in the literature
sheds much light on the behaviour of the oligopsonists in our study. For instance, the seminal
paper by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) models a two-stage game and proves that the Bertrand
Competition with production precommitment is equivalent to the Cournot Competition in a
duopoly model with a deterministic demand curve, but in our paper we assume the capacity
is exogenous. Hirata (2009) solves explicitly the Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium in a three-
firm oligopoly with asymmetric capacity, however, we assume symmetric capacity for the small
employers and unlimited capacity for the big employer in our model, which we believe has more
intuitive implications. The research paper by Bhaskar, Manning and To (2002) has a very
detailed discussion of duopolists’wage-posting strategy in the horizontal differentiated labour
market, as well as its implications in wage dispersion and minimum wages. We borrow the same
idea of horizontal differentiation in labour and expand it into the oligopsonistic competition of
three firms. Moreover, we assign the employers with limited and unlimited recruiting capacities
in our model, which to the best of our knowledge is the first to address its implications in the
trend of wage disparity in public and private sector by using such theoretical setup.
The structure of the paper can be divided into two parts: the wage-setting game and the
three-stage game.
In the wage-setting game, our focus is on the wage-posting strategy by the employers and
the horizontal heterogeneity of workers. We model a spatial market where three oligopsonists
(i.e. two co-locating small firms with recruiting capacity constraints and a large firm without
such limit) compete for a limited number of workers distributed along a "strip" market. For the
moment, the setup of the spatial market as well as the "physical" distribution of the workers
along it can be a metaphor of heterogeneous preferences or the ability of the individual workers
to work for a specific firm. In Hotelling’s (1929) and Salop’s (1979) papers, their notion of
the traveling costs to work can be literally interpreted as the actual commuting costs incurred
(physical distance), or as a subjective measure of an individual’s preference of one job over
another (psychological distance), or as the training cost to offset the differentials in ability to a
universal skill requirement (suitability distance). In any of the interpretations of the horizontal
heterogeneity in this model, the worker is willing to "travel" to the further or "the less preferred"
employer for a suffi cient wage premium. In the following section, we characterise the equilibrium
wages posted by all firms in the wage-setting game, given a uniform distribution of the workers
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along the "strip" market.
One novelty of our model is that it also brings in competition from a third firm, which
itself does not have recruiting limit at the other end of the "strip" market. In the price-setting
(wage-setting) game, the rationing rule of the residual demand (supply) affects the expected
profit (production) of the firms. Therefore, we need to elucidate the rationing scheme before
any conclusion of the consequent strategic behaviour can be discussed. In the literature on
oligopoly, Beckmann (1965) explicitly calculates the equilibrium by constructing a symmetric
Bertrand-Edgeworth model and using the proportional rationing rule (which means the high-
priced firm’s residual demand at any price is proportional to the overall market at that price).
Levitan and Shubik (1972) obtain the equilibrium of the symmetric model by using the effi cient
rationing rule (which means the highest-value consumers go to the low-priced firm). In spite of
the different rationing rules, both papers reach similar conclusions. That is: (i) the two firms
act as if they can combine their capacities together (i.e. they would produce up to each of their
capacities) and charge a universal monopolistic price (pure strategy) when their capacities are
small; (ii) the two firms randomise their wage within an interval (an atomless, symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium) when their capacities grow larger; (iii) they set the break-even price when
the capacities can meet the needs of the whole market. In this paper, we apply the effi cient
rationing rule and find a similar conclusion: (i) The small firms post a single but relatively
low wage, as though they combine the recruiting capacity together (pure strategy) when their
recruiting limits are low; (ii) they randomise their wages within an interval (i.e. a symmetric
mixed strategy but not necessarily atomless) when capacities grow larger; (iii) the employer at
the far end without capacity limit constantly adopts pure strategy in posting wage.
Apart from the elaboration of types of wage-posting strategies, we also find that the (ex-
pected) wages posted by the small employers are decreasing, whilst those posted by big the
employer are increasing as the capacities of the former shrink. The logic here is that the shrink-
ing capacity of the small firms lowers the wage competition between the two, and hence makes
it less expensive for the big firm to recruit more workers through positive externalities.
As mentioned before, the wage-setting game can be applied in a more general context (i.e.
the Hotelling preferences), while the second part of this paper (i.e. the three-stage game) is
more specific as we interpret the Hotelling line as the real traveling space. Here, we take into
account the possible interaction of the other side of the market, i.e. the relocation decision of
the workers. We propose the following framework for the three-stage model: (i) in the first
stage, the workers decide whether to relocate themselves, and of course permanent migration
requires a fixed cost; (ii) observing the realised distribution of workers along the market, the
big employer decides its wage offer; (iii) then, the two co-locating firms simultaneously and
non-cooperatively post wages. The sequence of the three-stage game is in line with the fact
that it’s much easier for the employers to adjust the wage offers than the employees’response
of relocation. In this paper we look at the extreme case that workers are initially located at the
two ends of the market respectively. In the discussion, we characterise the equilibrium wages
posted by firms as well as the size and direction of the migration.
In the next section we describe the model. In the first part of section 4.2, we discuss
the wage-setting game and characterise the equilibrium strategies played by all firms; in the
second part we apply the results of the former section in the three-stage-game framework, and
characterise the equilibrium; and in the third part we put forward some implications of the
previous models. In Section 4.3 we consider possible extensions and conclude.
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4.2 The Model
Consider the case of having three oligopsonists. We assume that a unit measure of workers are
located along the interval A-B with two co-locating small firms (with recruiting limits k)1 at
City A and a large firm (without recruiting limit) at City B. We only focus on the case when
k ≤ 12 throughout the paper as we are more interested in the wage competition between the
firms with very different sizes.
All the firms produce identical products. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that they all
have identical production function Q(L) = L where labour L is the only factor of production.
Each firm is a price taker and all the goods produced can be sold at price P . Thus, the marginal
revenue product of labour is equal to the marginal revenue, which is MRPL = MR = P .
4.2.1 A Wage-setting Game
In this subsection, we assume that the workers are uniformly distributed along a straight, mile-
long district between City A and City B. The heterogeneity in physical locations implies that
the workers have different wages net of traveling costs incurred. All workers have the same
reservation wage to stay employed (i.e. workers would like to accept all positive wages net
of commuting cost). It implies a monopsony context where the labour supply curve is linear,
such that L(w) =
w
c
, where c is the transportation cost per mile for the potential employees.
Since MRPL = P , all the firms will pay the workers no more than unit price of the production
P . Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity, let us assume c = P = 1, which implies that the
marginal worker is located right at the other city when the firm posts a wage up to the marginal
revenue P .
Concerning the labour market, each firm simultaneously and noncooperatively posts a wage
offer, wAi by firm i at City A (where i = 1, 2), and wB by the firm at City B. It’s a simultaneous
game, so the basic idea of the model can be presented generally as having the following two
aspects:
1) The two co-locating firms are bidding for the workers near City A. However, since they
are constrained by recruiting limits, we draw an instant intuition from the short-run price
competition in the Bertrand-Edgeworth Model that it generates either pure or mixed strategy
equilibrium which depends on the size of recruiting constraints, and both firms receive positive
profits.
2) If the firms in different cities are close enough, (here close means there is some overlap
of the labour force if we put together separately the equilibrium results of different cities), they
will compete for the workers in the middle region of the "strip" market.
Now let us consider only the wage competition between the two co-locating small firms at
City A (that is, ignoring the potential competing effect of their counterpart, the large firm, in
City B). It is easy to comprehend that in equilibrium both firms charge the competitive wage:
wAi = wAj = P and receive zero profit if they have infinite recruiting capacities (i.e. Bertrand
Equilibrium). However, as we have assumed limited recruiting capacities for the small firms,
the competitive wage is no longer the equilibrium. The intuition is: supposing one firm lowers
its wage slightly, it can readily make positive profit by recruiting the residual workers since the
1The recruiting capacity constraint can be attributed to diseconomies of scale for the small firms.
67
other firm can not absorb all the workers due to its recruiting cap. Of course, before explicitly
solving for the equilibrium, we need to specify in which manner the workers are rationed. Here,
we assume effi cient rationing rule when there is wage overbidding, which implies that the high-
wage firm recruits the high-value workers who are located nearer2 . That is, if firm i posts a
higher wage than firm j, it will absorb all available workers up to its recruiting capacity. The
firm that loses in wage competition can only recruit the residual workers, if any. We also assume
that the two firms would equally split the labour supply when they post a common wage. To
sum up, the labour supply for firm i can be written as follows.
LAi(wAi) =





, k) if wAi = wAj
min{max(wAi − k, 0), k} if wAi < wAj
(4.1)
Next, we take into account the wage competition from the large firm at the far end of the
"strip" market (i.e. City B). But first let us look at a simpler case of having only one firm in
City A, the wage competition between firms from different cities can be illustrated in Figure
4.1.
Figure 4.1: Illustration of workers’job choice with transportation costs
The horizontal axis represents the uniformly distributed workers along the mile-long "strip"
market, and the vertical axis denotes the net wage received by workers. Recalling the per mile
transportation cost c = 1, then a worker who is located x miles from City A would have to
incur a cost of x if he/she is employed by the firm in City A, or to incur a cost of (1 − x) if
employed by the firm in City B. Now suppose that there is one firm at each end of the market,
i.e. a firm in City A offers wage wA and a firm in City B (which we will simply call Firm B
from now on) offers wB . Since we have assumed that the workers accept all positive wages net
2Here, higher value refers to the higher wage net of transportation cost, thus, the high-value workers are those
who are located nearer to the firm. We consider the assumption of effi cient rationing more reasonable, in that
the workers who live nearer have better information about wage offers and can respond quicker to the firm that
posts a higher wage, or the employers prefer to recruit "local" residents in spite of their identical productivity.
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of commuting cost, it is straightforward that when the two net wage lines do not intersect, the
firm in City A recruits the workers to the left of xA while Firm B recruits the workers to the
right of xB , leaving those who are located between xA and xB unemployed. When the two net
wage lines intersect, the workers to the left of the intersection x∗ prefer to work in City A while
those to the right of x∗ prefer to work in City B. Therefore, we can see that the intersection of
the net wage lines indicates the competition between the firms from different cities.
Let us look at the marginal worker who is indifferent between working in City A and in City
B when the two net wage lines intersect. That is,
wA − x∗ = wB − (1− x∗)⇒ x∗ =
wA − wB + 1
2
The labour supply for the firm in City A (which is denoted by LA) is
LA(wA) =
wA − wB + 1
2
(4.2)
Likewise, the labour supply for the firm in City B is
LB(wB) =
wB − wA + 1
2
(4.3)
However, we need to keep in mind that the above expressions are for the case of having a
single firm at each city, thus, an extension must be made to fit into the three-firm model. The
labour supply function of the co-locating firm i in City A can be derived as
LAi(wAi) =

min(wAi, k) if wAj < wAi ≤ 1− wB
min(wAi−wB+12 , k) if 1− wB < wAi and wAj < wAi
min{max(wAi − k, 0), k} if wAi ≤ 1− wB and wAi < wAj




, k) if wAi = wAj ≤ 1− wB
min(wAi−wB+14 , k) if 1− wB < wAi = wAj
(4.4)
Next, let us move on to Firm B which does not have recruiting limit. It is relatively simple
to obtain its labour supply function as LB(wB) = wB if there is no intersection of the net
wage lines (i.e. wB < 1−max(wAi, wAj) and there is no competition between the firms coming
from different ends). However, Firm B’s labour supply function evolves to a more complicated
pattern if the net wage lines intersect. It needs to be discussed in two cases. Before that, let us
denote the intersect of the net wage line of Firm B with that of the higher-wage firm in City A
by x∗H , and the lower-wage firm by x
∗
L.
Case 4.1 The net wage line of firm B only intersects with that of the higher-wage firm in City
A, i.e. 1−max(wAi, wAj) < wB ≤ 1−min(wAi, wAj). (See Figure 4.2)
In Case 4.1, when k ≥ x∗H the higher-wage firm in City A employs the labour to the left of
x∗H and Firm B absorbs the rest, leaving the lower-wage firm in City A empty handed; when
1 − wB < k < x∗H , the higher-wage firm in City A recruits workers to it capacity k leaving
the rest to Firm B only; when min(wAi, wAj) < k ≤ 1 − wB the higher-wage firm in City A
recruits to its capacity k but Firm B only has the workers to the right of (1−wB), leaving the
lower-wage firm in City A recruits no one; when k ≤ min(wAi, wAj), the higher-wage firm in
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the net wage lines in Case 4.1
City A recruits to its capacity k, and Firm B has the workers to the right of (1−wB), and the
lower-wage firm in City A recruits min(min(wAi, wAj)− k, k).
Case 4.2 The net wage line of Firm B intersects with the net wage lines of both firms in City
A, i.e. wB > 1−min(wAi, wAj). (See Figure 4.3)
Figure 4.3: Illustration the net wage lines in Case 4.2
Similarly, when k ≥ x∗H the higher-wage firm in City A employs the labour to the left of x∗H ,
and Firm B absorbs the rest, leaving the lower-wage firm empty handed; when x∗L ≤ k < x∗H




2 ≤ k < x
∗
L the higher-wage firm in City A employs up to it capacity k, but
Firm B only has the workers to the right of x∗L, and the lower-wage firm in City A recruits
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(1 − x∗L − k); when k <
x∗L
2 both firms in City A employ up to the capacity k and Firm B
employs min(1− 2k, 1− wB).
To sum up, the labour supply function of the firm in City B can be written as follows:
1) NO intersect, i.e. wB ≤ 1−max(wAi, wAj) LB(wB) = wB
2) ONE intersect (Case 4.1)
i.e. 1−max(wAi, wAj) < wB ≤ 1−min(wAi, wAj)
(i) and k > max(wAi,wAj)−wB+12 LB(wB) =
wB−max(wAi,wAj)+1
2
(ii) and 1− wB ≤ k ≤ max(wAi,wAj)−wB+12 LB(wB) = 1− k
(iii) and k ≤ 1− wB LB(wB) = wB
3) TWO intersects (Case 4.2), i.e. wB > 1−min(wAi, wAj)
(i) and k > max(wAi,wAj)−wB+12 LB(wB) =
wB−max(wAi,wAj)+1
2
(ii) and min(wAi,wAj)−wB+12 < k ≤
max(wAi,wAj)−wB+1
2 LB(wB) = 1− k
(iii) and k ≤ min(wAi,wAj)−wB+12 LB(wB) =
wB−min(wAi,wAj)+1
2
So far, the labour supply for all firms have been outlined as above. Let us proceed to the
discussion of the optimal strategies by these firms in equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1 If and only if 0 < k ≤ 13 , there exists a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium
that both firms in City A post a common wage offer of 2k and Firm B posts a wage offer of
min(1− 2k, 12 ).
Proof. First, we show that no competition happens between the firms from different cities
when 0 < k ≤ 14 .
We note that the aggregate labour demand for the firms in City A will not exceed 12 due
to their recruiting limits k. Also, as the profit function of Firm B is πB = wB(1 − wB), it is
straightforward to show that it would maximise the profit by setting the wage as high as 12 and
recruits the workers to the right of xB = 12 . Then, it can be implied that there is no overlap of
competition for the firms from different cities. Thus, the profit function for the firms in City A
can be written as
πAi(wAi) =

min(wAi, k)(1− wAi) if wAi > wAj
min(wAi2 , k)(1− wAi) if wAi = wAj
min{max(wAi − k, 0), k}(1− wAi) if wAi < wAj
(4.5)
We start by looking at the symmetric case when wAi = wAj . If k > wAi2 , then the first order
condition of the second line in (4.5) yields arg maxπAi(wAi) = 12 which contradicts
wAi
2 < k ≤
1
4 .
If k ≤ wAi2 , then the profit function becomes πAi(wAi) = k(1 − wAi) which is monotonically
decreasing in wAi. It yields arg maxπAi(wAi) = 2k as both firms in City A recruit to their
capacities and have no incentives to deviate up by posting higher wages. On the other hand,
if one firm lowers its wage from 2k to (2k − ε) where ε is small and positive, then its profit
changes from k(1−2k) to (2k− ε−k)(1−2k+ ε). We note that the change in profit is negative
for 0 < k ≤ 13 . Thus, in this way we have precluded the asymmetric strategies in equilibrium.
Next comes the case that 14 < k ≤
1
3 . We first look at the situation where there is the same
marginal worker for the firms in City A and Firm B, which implies that the profit function for








workers. However, at that time, either firm would enjoy a jump in labour supply by overbidding




by using the same argument as in the previous paragraph, we can see that the firms in City A
only choose to post a common wage of 2k in equilibrium and again the asymmetric strategies
are ruled out.
Let us move on to the strategy of Firm B. When 14 < k ≤
1
3 , (as we have shown that its
counterparts in City A adopt a symmetric strategy which is wAi = wAj = 2k,) the labour
supply function for Firm B can be easily written as
πB(wB) =
{
wB(1− wB) if wB ≤ 1− 2k
(wB−2k+1)(1−wB)
2 if wB > 1− 2k
(4.6)
If wB > 1−2k, the first order condition of the second line in (4.6) yields arg maxπB(wB) = k
which contradicts 1−wB2 < k ≤
1




4 < k ≤
1
3 .
Hence, the first line in (4.6) yields that arg maxπB(wB) = 1−2k. It means that when 14 < k ≤
1
3
and the firms in City A pay 2k, the optimal strategy for Firm B is to pay (1− 2k) and not to
compete with firms in City A.
Moreover, we are able to gain some intuition about equilibrium strategies when k > 13 . If
both firms in City A adopt pure symmetric strategy (i.e. each firm in City A posts a common
wage that is greater or equal to 2k), then as shown in previous argument, either of them can
benefit by deviating downward. And if they post a common wage such that wAi = wAj < 2k,
either firm can benefit by overbidding. Therefore, we rule out the pure strategy for the firms
in City A when k > 13 .
The intuition of Proposition 4.1 is that when 0 < k ≤ 13 the small employers always post
wage at the joint monopolistic level as if there is no pressure of competition from the far end.
Moreover, the proof in Proposition 4.1 also implies that, even without considering the possible
competition from Firm B, the two firms in City A will adopt mixed strategy in posting wages
when k > 13 . Moreover, we learn from the above proof that Firm B would benefit by raising
the wage when k > 13 . Thus, we conjecture that there is a unique equilibrium when k exceeds
1
3 , the firms in City A adopt mixed strategy and Firm B adopts pure strategy.
Recall that mixed strategy equilibrium is to follow a pair of probability distribution over
the respective strategy spaces, and each participant will choose any strategy with positive
probability in order to maximise its own expected payoffs against its counterpart’s strategy
mix. Therefore, the top priority for solving the mixed strategy lies in the identification of the
lower and upper bound of the wage offers posted by firms in City A. We denote the lower and
upper bound of the mixed strategy by wA and w̄A respectively, and denote the c.d.f. by G(wA).
Next, we introduce a corollary to state the overlap of the strategies for firms in different
cities, and it will be followed by a proposition that characterises the equilibrium strategies for
all firms when k exceeds 13 .
Corollary 4.1 For 13 < k ≤
1
2 , the pure strategy for Firm B overlaps with the whole boundaries
of the mixed strategy for the firms in City A; that is 1− wB ≤ wA ≤ w̄A.
Proof. We prove 1− wB ≤ wA by contradiction.
Suppose 1−wB > wA holds. If a firm picks the bottom wage wA which is surely below the
wage offered by its local counterpart, we can write the profit function by using the third line in
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(4.4). Also, in mixed strategy equilibrium all the participants have positive expected payoffs,
and thus the profit function can be written as
π(wA) = (wA − k)(1− wA)
Profit maximisation implies that wA = 1+k2 .
Recall that 13 < k ≤
1




4 ]. As we learn from the proof in Proposition
(4.1) that wB > 13 , it contradicts our presumption that 1−wB > wA. Thus, it is straightforward
to yield the results in Corollary 4.1.
Proposition 4.2 For 13 < k ≤
1
2
(i) the firms in City A randomise their wage offers within the interval [k + 12 ,
13k−2k2−2
9k ]
following a c.d.f. of G(t) = (2k−3t+1)
2
3(t−1)(10k−3t−1) ;
(ii) Firm B adopts pure strategy in wage posting, i.e. wB =
2(1−k)
3 .
Proof. We first derive the profit function by making the firm in City A choose the bottom
wage. Corollary 4.1 implies that the fourth line of (4.4) is the labour supply for the firm. Thus,
given the wage wB posted by Firm B, the profit function can be written as follows.
πA(wA) = (
wA − wB + 1
2






Substituting for wA in (4.7) by using (4.8), we obtain the expected profit for the firm in
City A, which is (2−wB−2k)
2
8 .
Next, consider the situation where the firm picks the top wage, then it will surely offer a
higher wage than its local counterpart. We also learn from (4.7) that w̄A−wB+12 > k, which
implies that the second line in (4.4) is the labour supply for the firm. Thus, the profit function
can be written as
πA(w̄A) = k(1− w̄A) (4.9)
One feature of mixed strategy equilibrium is that each player is indifferent among all the
actions that he or she selects, conditional on the mixed strategy of his/her counterparts. It
implies that the expected payoffs (profits) of the firm are the same whenever it picks lowest or
highest wage. Thus, (4.9) is equal to the expected profit we have derived previously. That is
πA(w̄A) = k(1− w̄A) =
(2− wB − 2k)2
8
(4.10)
Solving for w̄A, we obtain
w̄A = 1−
(2− wB − 2k)2
8k
(4.11)
The general profit function for the firm in City A can be derived as
πA(wA) = G(wA)k(1− wA) + [1−G(wA)](
wA − wB + 1
2
− k)(1− wA) (4.12)
where G(·)is the c.d.f. for the mixed strategy
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As we mentioned before, in mixed strategy equilibrium each player has the same payoffs
among all his/her actions, again we can equate (4.12) to the expected payoffs (2−wB−2k)
2
8 .
Thus, we have derived the c.d.f. for the mixed strategy for the firms in City A, given the wage
posted by Firm B. That is
G(wA, wB) =
(2wA − wB − 2k)2
4 (1− wA) (wB + 4k − wA − 1)
(4.13)
So far, the mixed strategy (which is also the best response) for the firms in City A has been
properly characterised in (4.8) (4.11) and (4.13).
Next, let’s turn to the wage-posting strategy by Firm B.
We learn from Corollary 4.1 that the net wage line of Firm B intersects with the net wage
lines of both firms in City A. Also, we learn from (4.7) that wA−wB+12 ≥ k. Thus, the labour
supply function (iii) in Case 2 should be used to derive the profit for Firm B. That is
πB(wB) =
wB −min(wA,i, wA,j) + 1
2
(1− wB)
Since the firms in City A randomly choose wages, min(wA,i, wA,j) (i.e. the first order
statistic) is a random variable which follows a c.d.f. of [1− (1−G)2]. Thus, the expected profit
function for Firm B is
EπB(wB) = (1− wB)
∫ 1−(2−wB−2k)2/8k
wB/2+k























In order to find the maximised expected profit for Firm B, we examine the first derivative













It can be checked that dEπB(wB)dwB < 0
3 . Also recall from Corollary 4.1 that wB has a lower
bound of (1− wA), thus, we obtain
arg max
wB








3We have not included the analytical proof of this statement, but a number of numerical examples have been
carried out to show a negative derivative.
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13k − 2k2 − 2
9k
G(wA) =
(2k − 3wA + 1)2
3 (1− wA) (10k − 3wA − 1)
So far, the mixed strategy for the firms in City A and the pure strategy for Firm B are fully
characterised by the above expressions, and we have completed all the proofs of Proposition
4.2.
To have a better idea how the equilibrium strategies for all firms look like, we introduce the
following example to illustrate the equilibrium wage(s) posted at a specific level of recruiting
capacity. It will be followed by a more comprehensive graph which shows the comparative
statics with respect to k.
Example 4.1 Suppose each firm in City A has a recruiting capacity of k = 0.4. Calculate the
equilibrium wage(s) posted by the firms in City A and Firm B.
Since k = 0.4 > 13 , as stated in Proposition 4.2, the firms in City A adopt a mixed strategy
to post their wage and Firm B uses pure strategy. Solving for wB , wA, w̄A and G(wA), we
obtain that the firms in City A randomise their wage offers within [0.6, 0.8] which follows a
c.d.f. of G(t) = (t− 0.6)2 / (t− 1)2, and Firm B adopts the pure strategy of paying 0.4. We
depict the strategies played by the firms in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.4: The boundary of the mixed strategy for the firms in City A and the pure strategy
for Firm B
So far, the discussion of the parameter space of recruiting capacity k is complete. In order to
further understand the wage-setting mechanism in the current model, we plot all the equilibrium
wage(s) with respect to each specific level of recruiting limit k in Figure 4.6.
When 0 < k ≤ 13 , each firm in City A posts a common wage of 2k and recruit to capacity
(i.e. the dark solid line till k = 13 ) while Firm B posts a wage of min(
1
2 , 1 − 2k) (i.e. the red







Figure 4.5: p.d.f. of the mixed strategy played by the firms in City A.









Figure 4.6: Equilibrium strategies of all firms with respect to the recruiting limits k
When 13 < k ≤
1
2 , taking into account the competition from Firm B, the firms in City A
randomise wage offers within the lower and upper bound (i.e. the dark solid curves to the right
of k = 1/3), while Firm B posts a wage which is represented by red line to the right of k = 1/3
(Proposition 4.2).
We observe form Figure 4.6 that when the recruiting limit exceeds the critical level of 13
there is a sudden jump in the strategies of all firms. The intuition is that, suppose Firm B still
uses the pure strategy by posting a wage of (1 − 2k). On the one hand, if it raises wage from
(1 − 2k) to (1 − 2k + ε), the profit would change from (1 − 2k)2k to 1−2k+ε−2k+12 (2k − ε) for
ε is small and positive. We note that the change is negative for 0 < k ≤ 13 , and positive for
1
3 ≤ k ≤
1
2 . On the other hand, if it lowers the wage from (1 − 2k) to (1 − 2k − ε), the profit
would change from (1− 2k)2k to (1− 2k − ε)(2k + ε). We note that the change is negative for
k > 14 , and positive for k ≤
1
4 . Thus, it implies when k slightly exceeds
1
3 Firm B will have the
incentive to deviate upward from (1− 2k) = 13 .
Another thing that captures our interest is that when the small firms’recruiting capacity k
expands within the range ( 13 ,
1
2 ], the wages offered by the small firms increase while the wage
offered by the big firm decreases. The intuition here is relatively easy to grasp. The growing
capacities of the small firms intensify the wage competition between the two, which makes it
more expensive for the big firm to recruit more workers. Here, an interesting result can be
inferred from its reverse. That is, as the recruiting capacities in the small employers shrink,
76
there is a wage increase at the big employer and a wage cut at the small employers.
However, the discussion would make more sense if we considered the interaction from work-
ers. If the workers can form a reliable expectation of the net income (i.e. the wage posted by
the firms net of the transportation cost that would be incurred), they would possibly choose
to migrate from one city to another in the first place in order to enjoy a higher expected net
income. Motivated by this, in the next subsection we introduce a three-stage game by allowing
the workers to move in the first stage and then the big firm and the small firms sequentially set
wages in the second and third stage.
4.2.2 A Three-stage Game
In this subsection, we consider a three-stage game between workers and oligopsonists in the
similar context to the above wage-setting game. The setup of this three-stage game is formulated
as follows:
In the three-stage game we take into account the possible migrating decisions of the workers.
In order to facilitate the analysis, we only look at the case of two-point distribution, i.e. there
are α workers initially residing in City A and the other (1−α) workers in City B. Here, all the
workers are homogeneous and with the same reservation wage w0. Additionally, we assume that
commuting from one city to another requires a cost of c, while permanent migration from one
city to another requires a one-off cost of s. As in the previous setup, the two co-locating firms
in City A are constrained by recruiting capacity k but Firm B is not. The game is formulated
in the following sequence4 .
(i) In the first stage, workers are allowed to relocate themselves at a one-off cost of s. Thus,
a labour market is formed with β workers residing in City A and the other (1− β) workers in
City B.
(ii) In the second stage, observing the distribution of the workers in the market, the big firm
decides its wage offer.
(iii) In the third stage, the two co-locating firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively set
wages.
The key point here is that as the workers have perfect knowledge about the wage-posting
strategy by the firm in the following stages, some of them would choose to relocate themselves
in the first stage for higher (expected) payoffs. Here, we need to note that net wage includes:
(1) the wages set by the firms; (2) the commuting cost that would be deducted from wage, if
any; and (3) the migration cost incurred, if any. Next, we use backward induction by looking
at the wage-setting game first and then coming back to the migration decision of the workers.
First, we have a short discussion of the case when β ≤ k, i.e. the individual recruiting
capacity of the co-locating firms exceeds the size of all local workers. It is relatively easy to
comprehend that, when Firm B keeps all its local workers in equilibrium, the two co-locating
firms in City A would always try to overbid its local rival to avoid nil labour supply. More
specifically, when (1 − β)c ≥ (1 − 2k)(1 − w0) Firm B pays (1 − c) for all its local workers
and the two co-locating firms post a common wage that equals the marginal revenue P = 1 in
equilibrium. When (1 − β)c < (1 − 2k)(1 − w0) Firm B chooses to pay w0 for (1 − 2k) local
4The sequence of the three-stage game is in line with the fact that it’s much easier for the employers to adjust
the wage offers than the employees’response of relocating.
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workers; meanwhile, each firm in City A pays (w0 + c) for k workers. We need to note that
(2k − β) City B residents are daily commuters working for the firms in City A.
Secondly, we examine the case when k < β < 2k, i.e. the size of the local workers in City
A exceeds the individual recruiting capacity but not the aggregate capacities of the two co-
locating firms. If the wage offered by Firm i in City A is less than the net wage from Firm B or
the reservation wage, it attracts nobody; if Firm i offers a wage that is less than its local rival’s
but still higher than the net wage from Firm B, it recruits the residual local workers; if Firm i
offers a wage that is higher than its local rival’s or the net wage from Firm B, it would employ




0 if wAi < max(wB − c, w0)
β − k if max(wB − c, w0) ≤ wAi ≤ min(wB + c, wAj)
k if wAi > min(wB + c, wAj)
(4.16)
The wage-setting strategy here is similar to the results we have derived in the previous
subsection. When one of the co-locating firms overbids a little bit, it would benefit from the
jump in labour supply. Meanwhile, it does not necessarily need to pay as high as the marginal
revenue since there is some residual labour supply locally due to the recruiting limit of its local
rival. Therefore, it implies a similar mixed strategy to be adopted by firm i in City A, which
we will specify in the following paragraphs.
If a firm in City A picks the bottom wage w, it will surely offer a lower wage than its
counterpart. Also, since mixed strategy equilibrium requires that all the participants have
positive expected payoffs, it implies that the net wage of Firm B for the residents in City A will
not exceed the bottom wage offered by the firms in City A. That is
max(wB − c, w0) ≤ wA (4.17)
It implies that the firm in City A recruits (β − k) when it picks the bottom wage. Thus,
the profit function can be written as
πA,3−stage(wA) = (β − k)(1− wA) (4.18)
Profit maximisation implies
wA = max(wB − c, w0) (4.19)
It follows that
πA,3−stage(wA) = (β − k)(1−max(wB − c, w0)) (4.20)
Similarly, if the firm picks the top wage w̄A, it will surely offer a higher wage than its
counterpart. The profit function can be written as
π(w̄A) = k(1− w̄A) (4.21)
One feature of mixed strategy equilibrium is that each player is indifferent among all the
actions that he or she selects conditional on mixed strategy space of the counterparts. We
therefore equate (4.20) with (4.21), and obtain the expression of w̄A, which is
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w̄A = 1−
(β − k)(1−max(wB − c, w0))
k
(4.22)
So far, we have derived the lower and upper bound of the mixed strategy for the firms in
City A. Next, our task is to find the distribution of the mixed strategy. Recall from (4.17) that
the net wage of Firm B for the residents in City A will not exceed the bottom wage offered by
the firms in City A. However, we have no idea whether the net wage offered by the firms in
City A for the residents in City B exceeds the wage of Firm B or not. It needs to be discussed
in the following two scenarios.
Scenario (i): w̄A < wB + c.
By using (4.17), it follows that wB − c ≤ wA ≤ w̄A < wB + c. Thus, by using (4.16) the
general form of the profit function for the firm in City A is
πA,3−stage(wA) = H(wA)k(1− wA) + [1−H(wA)](β − k)(1− wA) (4.23)
where H(·)is the c.d.f. of the mixed strategy
Since each player has the same payoffs among all his/her actions in mixed strategy equilib-
rium, we can equate (4.23) to (4.20). Thus, given the Firm B’s wage, the c.d.f. of the mixed
strategy for firms in City A can be derived as
H(wA) =
(β − k)(wA −max(wB − c, w0))
(2k − β)(1− wA)
(4.24)
Scenario (ii): w̄A ≥ wB + c.
We note that, in this case, the firm in City A would grasp some of the workers from City B
to its recruiting capacity when its net wage exceeds the wage of Firm B. By using (4.16), the
profit function for the firm in City A can be written as
πA,3−stage(wA) = (1−H(wA))H(wB + c)(β − k)(1− wA)
+[1− (1−H(wA))H(wB + c)]k(1− wA) (4.25)
It seems a bit complicated, but we can manipulate it by letting wA be at the lower bound
wA, and equate it with (4.18). It yields
(β − k)(1− wA)H(wB + c) = (β − k)(1− wA)
⇒ H(wB + c) = 1 (4.26)
Recall our presumption here is that w̄A ≥ wB + c, thus, we can conclude that w̄A = wB + c,
which implies an atom of probability at the upper bound of the mixed strategy space. The
intuition here is easy to understand: when a firm in City A picks the top wage it will surely
recruit workers to its capacity, and there is no point of making higher wage offer to gain more
workers from City B. Also, recalling from (4.17) that Firm B attracts no residents in City A
in equilibrium, it is relatively simple to arrive at the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2 For k < β < 2k, all the workers are employed by their local employer(s) in
equilibrium.
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By using Corollary 4.2, the profit function for Firm B can be written as
πB,3−stage(wB) = (1− β)(1− wB)
Since wB ≥ w0, in equilibrium, Firm B will offer a wage that equals the reservation wage of
all the workers.
Thus, the lower bound of the mixed strategy for the firms in City A also equals to w0
by using (4.19). Now, the equilibrium wage-posting strategy for the firms in City A can be
summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3 i) If β > k(2−2w0−c)1−w0 , then the firms in City A randomise their wages within
the interval [w0, 1− (β − k)(1− w0)/k] following a c.d.f. of H(wA) = (β−k)(wA−w0)(2k−β)(1−wA) ;
ii) If β ≤ k(2−2w0−c)1−w0 , then the firms in City A randomise their wages within the interval
[w0 − c, w0 + c) following a c.d.f. of H(wA) = (β−k)(wA−w0)(2k−β)(1−wA) ; additionally, the distribution has
an atom probability of (1−H(w0 + c)) at its upper bound of w̄A = w0 + c.
Proof. The mixed strategy for the firms in City is atomless in Scenario (i) when w̄A < wB + c.
By using (4.22), it follows that
1− (β − k)(1−max(wB − c, w0))
k
< wB + c
⇒ 1− (β − k)(1− w0)
k
< w0 + c
⇒ β > k(2− 2w0 − c)
1− w0
The mixed strategy for the firms in City A has an atom at its upper bound in Scenario (ii)
when
w̄A ≥ wB + c
⇒ β ≤ k(2− 2w0 − c)
1− w0
Also, we note that (4.23) and (4.25) are exactly the same if we substitute (4.26) into (4.25).
Then the c.d.f. within [w0, w0 + c) is identical to (4.24). It is relatively easy to derive that the
atom probability of the upper bound (i.e. w̄A = w0 + c) is (1−H(w0 + c)).
Lastly, we turn to the case when β ≥ 2k. It is relatively easy to check that all three firms
set a common wage that equals the reservation wage for the workers.
So far, the wage-posting strategy by firms in both City A and B has been well characterised.
We introduce the following numerical example to illustrate the comparative statics with respect
to the realised two-point distribution in the second stage.
Example 4.2 Given the recruiting capacity k = 0.4 for each of the firm in City A, the com-
muting cost c = 0.1 and the reservation wage w0 = 0.6, by observing the labour distribution
(i.e. β in City A, (1− β) in City B), the equilibrium wage(s) offered by the firms in both cities
are displayed in Figure 4.7.
When β ≤ 0.2 all firms recruit the local workers. Firm B pays (1 − c) for (1 − β) workers
and the two co-locating firms in City A post a common wage that equals the marginal revenue
of product (i.e. wA1 = wA2 = 1).
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When 0.2 < β ≤ 0.4 = k Firm B pays w0 for (1 − 2k) local workers and each firm in City
A pays (w0 + c) for k workers. (0.8− β) City B residents are daily commuters working for the
firms in City A.
When k = 0.4 < β < 0.8 = 2k, there is residual labour supply for the lower-wage firm
in City A, thus the two co-locating firms are in a Bertrand-Edgeworth situation and adopt
mixed strategy and Firm B adopts pure strategy. It can be seen from Figure 4.7 that, given a
specific distribution of the workers (i.e β in City A and (1− β) in City B), both firms in City
A randomise their wage offers between the lower bound (i.e. the red solid line segment within
(0.4, 0.8)) and the upper bound (i.e. the kinked dark line within (0.4, 0.8)). Additionally, the
expected wage offered by the firm in City A is indicated by the dashed curve in Figure 4.7. The
wage offered by Firm B is represented by the horizontal red line in Figure 4.7.
When β ≥ 0.8 = 2k, all three firms offer a common wage that equals w0.
We observe that the (expected) wages offered by all the firms are weakly declining in β,
and we anticipate a similar result if we extend the two-point distribution. The intuition here is
that as the recruiting capacities for the firms in City A are fixed, more workers residing in City
A would release the wage competition between the two co-locating firms. Moreover, since the
wage offers are strategic complements, the further consequence would be that Firm B would
also lower its wage but still remain as attractive as before.









Figure 4.7: The wage(s) offered by firms in equilibrium when k = 0.4 , c = 0.1, and w0 = 0.6
So far in Proposition 4.3 we have derived a full characterisation of equilibrium strategies of
wage posting for all the firms in the second and third stages. Next, we move on to the first stage
to examine whether the workers have incentive to relocate themselves in a different city, given
they have perfect knowledge about the wage-setting strategies for their prospective employers.
To begin with, we need to derive the (expected) wage received by workers.
Recall that when β ≤ k all the firms adopt pure strategies, then the (net) wage received by
a worker equals the wage offered by his/her local recruiter(s).
When k < β < 2k the firms in City A randomise their wage offers, there is uncertainty in
the expected wages for the workers in City A. Recall from Corollary 4.2 that all the workers
are to be recruited by the local employer(s). On the one hand, the workers in City B receive
w0. On the other hand, every worker in City A has a probability of kβ of being offered a higher
wage which follows a c.d.f. of H2(wA) (i.e. the second order statistic), and has a probability of
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(1− kβ ) to be paid a lower wage which follows a c.d.f. of [1− (1−H(wA))
2] (i.e. the first order
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+(1−H(w0 + c))2(w0 + c)
if β ≤ k(2−2w0−c)1−w0
where w̄A = 1− (β−k)(1−w0)k and H(t) =
(β−k)(t−w0)
(2k−β)(1−t)
The (expected) wage received by the workers in City A is represented by the dotted curve
in Figure 4.8. We need to note that, in the mixed strategy context, the expected wage received
(i.e. the portion of dotted curve within (k, 2k)) is different from the expected wage offered (i.e.
the dashed curve) in Figure 4.7.
When β ≥ 2k the firms in City A would set a common wage that is attractive to the
local workers in the third stage. Having full knowledge of this, Firm B would set a wage that
equals the reservation wage in second stage. Thus, all the firms posts a common wage of w0 in
equilibrium, which is also the wage received by all the workers.
Figure 4.8: The (expected) wage received by the workers in City A and City B
Next, we look for the condition under which there is migration.
In Figure 4.8, we shift upward the red horizontal lines which represent the wage received
by the workers in City B by s, the one-off permanent migrating cost. When s < c, the dotted
curve and the dashed line intersect at β0, where β0 is implicitly defined by:
EwA(β0, k) = w0 + s
Now we are able to arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4 [i] If there is migration, it is from City B to City A;
[ii] s < c and α < β0 are necessary conditions for migration.
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Proof. It is easy to comprehend that when s ≥ c no worker has the motivation to migrate in
the first place, since he/she can always enjoy a higher net wage by paying the daily commuting
fees rather than paying a higher one-off migrating cost.
Also, when α ≥ β the expected gain by migrating turns out to be too costly to recoup the
migrating cost, thus, all the workers choose to stay.
Furthermore, it can also readily be implied from Figure 4.8 that there are (β0 − α) workers
migrating from City B to City A when s < c and α < β0. And it coincides with our intuition
that increase in the daily commuting cost (c) and/or decrease in the permanent migrating cost
(s) encourage more migration, if any.
4.2.3 Implication of Wage Dispersion and Trend of Wage Disparity
We have introduced two simple frameworks of the oligopsonistic competition in the above dis-
cussion. However, the value of the oligopsony approach to the labour market should ultimately
be judged by its soundness in understanding and explaining the major issues in the labour
market. Next, we put forward some areas where our models of oligopsonistic competition have
helped to improve understanding.
"Law of one wage", which means that there is a single market wage for a given number
of workers, is the key prediction of perfectly competitive labour market. However, volumin-
ous empirical literature finds evidence of substantial wage dispersion among workers doing the
same job in the same city (but not necessarily for the same employer). In the search theoretical
context, the wage dispersion can be attributed to the search friction as well as the "compet-
ence" parameter (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002), i.e. heterogeneous worker abilities and firm
productivities. In the two-firm duoposony framework, symmetry in firm productivity yields
identical wages for all workers, and wage dispersion only rises in the case of the asymmetric
productivity case (Bhaskar, Manning, and To, 2002). Now we might wonder whether the di-
versity in firm productivity is the only reason for wage dispersion, but apart from that, we do
observe wage dispersion among homogeneous workers in the firms of similar productivity in the
real world.
The wage dispersion issue for the firms with identical productivity can be handled con-
veniently with the setup of the wage-setting game in this paper. Recalling the setup in our
oligopsony model that the small firms are identical but constrained by recruiting capacities,
these employers do not necessary engage themselves in cutthroat wage competition since they
may enjoy the residual labour supply which cannot be met by its rival. On the other hand, it’s
always beneficial to overbid, thus the small firms would end up adopting a mixed strategy in
equilibrium. As a matter of fact, the wage dispersion in our model rises from the randomisation
in wage-posting strategy by the small firms. The assumption of recruiting capacity constraints
is in line with the reality of many private firms in the marketplace.
In spite of the wage dispersion amongst the small identical employers, we also address the
trend of wage disparity between small and large employers as the recruiting capacities vary.
We show that as the recruiting capacity shrinks there is a wage cut instigated by the small
employers, whilst there is a pay rise in big employers. This is where there is scant theoretical
or empirical analysis, but where there is interest since it is in line with the trend of wage
disparity, especially as a consequence of economic downturns. The intuition here is that the
reduced recruiting capacity mitigates the wage competition and drives down the wages of small
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employers, and in this way it reduces the marginal expenditure of labour of the competitor with
no recruiting limit. As a result, the large firm absorbs more workers and meanwhile its wage
goes up. However, we do not want to over-exploit the contribution of this result and hence only
regard this as the partial explanation for the trend of wage disparity, since there might be other
underlying factors such as implicit benefit received in large firms.
4.3 Conclusion
We have shown that in a spatial market of oligopsonists, two co-locating small firms with
recruiting capacity constraints and a large firm without such limit are all competing for workers
with horizontal differentiation. We have considered two frameworks.
In the wage-setting game, we use a uniform distribution of the workers along the "strip"
market and elaborate upon the equilibrium wage-posting strategies adopted by all the firms,
taking the recruiting capacity of the small firms as the only parameter. We show that when the
recruiting limit is below some critical level (i.e. k ≤ 13 ) there are pure strategies of wage-posting
for both the small and large firms (i.e. the small firms post a common monopolistic wage of
2k, as though they can combine their capacities together, while the big employer sets wage at
min(1 − 2k, 12 )). When the recruiting limit exceeds some critical level (i.e. k >
1
3 ), there is a
sudden jump in the strategies of all firms at k = 13 + ε, where ε is small and positive. As the
recruiting capacities expand, the big firm cuts its wage while the small ones raise theirs. The
intuition here is that the growing capacities of the small firms intensify the wage competition
among themselves, which makes it more expensive for the big firm at the far end to recruit more
workers through negative externalities. Besides, the reverse of this conclusion sheds some light
on the recent trend of wage disparity between the private and public sector that has occurred
during economic recession.
While it is relatively easy to understand the wage-setting model and characterise the equi-
librium in the context of a spatial market, it is important to note that the physical distribution
of the agents is actually a metaphor of heterogeneous preferences over the jobs, or the hetero-
geneous abilities to fulfill a job. Accordingly, the traveling cost can be interpreted as either a
physical or psychological cost that needs to be overcome, and the permanent migration cost can
be interpreted as a one-off training fee (borne by workers) to top up the qualifications needed
for the jobs.
There are both merits and deficits in selecting the wage-setting game or the three-stage
game. As we mentioned, the former can be applied in a more general context (i.e. the Hotelling
preferences), while the latter is more specific as we interpret the Hotelling line as the real
traveling space. And the setup of the three-stage game enables us to consider the possible
interaction of the other side of the market (i.e. the decision of permanent migration for workers).
Also, it is true that a prior bimodal distribution of workers can also be applied in the wage-
setting model and would make more sense than the uniform distribution we have used. However,
this simplified assumption has helped us to have some idea about which wage-posting strategies
are employed by all the firms in the market. In the three-stage game, for the sake of brevity, we
have assumed a two-point distribution of homogeneous workers, which helps us to concentrate
on the interaction of the firms’wage-setting strategies and the workers’migration decisions.
Besides, in some sense, the two-point distribution assumption does represent an extreme case
of the bimodal distribution and as such merits investigation.
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For brevity’s sake, we have not explicitly explained the case of asymmetric assignment of
recruiting capacities nor the competition among more than three firms. In our viewpoint,
the solution of the three-oligopsonist case is already enough to shed some light on the wage
competition among employers. With regard to the unequal capacities, the solution appears to
be more of complex mathematical question than of particular economic interest.
Other interesting points include the discussion of the coordination issue amongst workers’
migration - identification of the most probable equilibrium that would rise. Furthermore, an-
other interesting question is to look at how much of the intuition captured in this paper can be
carried over to a more general market, where the workers are bimodal distributed in the hori-
zontal differential space, and how the wage bidding strategy of the firms will induce permanent
reallocation of the workers. Our model is clearly a starting point for such further analysis.
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